ABROGAR v. COSMOS

ABROGAR vs. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES INC.

G.R. No. 064749

March 15, 2017

Facts:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race. The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.

In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P17,806.16) as attorney's fees. On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames, Inc, is hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may be recovered by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence; that the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective for risks inherent in the marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third persons; and that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the petitioners from Cosmos.

All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to award such damages upon the assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed. The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:

1. Whether or not appellant Intergames were negligent in its conduct of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.

2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with appellant Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.

3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son Rommel.

4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary damages granted to them by the Trial Court. In its assailed judgment on March 10, 2004 and in view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar, appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and academic. UPON THE VIEW OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo. The appellants shall bear their respective costs.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:

A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and

B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its participants.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being against public policy.

3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and) in absolving respondent Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent Intergames contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.

4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary damages for the death of their child, Rommel Abrogar.

Held:

1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.

2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements, namely; the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;he must further understand its nature; and his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be taken to consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.

3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr.

4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.