Showing posts with label June. Show all posts
Showing posts with label June. Show all posts

RODRIGUEZ v. PARK N RIDE

LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner vs PARK N RIDE INC.NICEST (PHILS) INC./GRAND LEISURE CORP./SPS. VICENTE & ESTELITA B. JAVIER, Respondents
G.R. No. 222980
January 18, 2017 


Facts:

Rodriguez alleged that she was employed at Sps. Javier’s numerous companies, the last being Park N Ride. Aside from that, she also attends to incidental tasks not related to her official position, like buying household necessities for one of her bosses Estelita Javier (Estelita). She also allegedly worked strenuous hours. She was deducted an equivalent of two (2) days' wage for every day of absence.

In one instance, Estelita was mad at her for opening the office late and told her that if she did not want to continue with her work, the company could manage without her. Thus, Rodriguez eventually submitted a letter expressing her gripes at the Sps. Javier to which the latter construed and accepted as the former’s resignation.

In their Position Paper, Sps. Javier stated that they hired and trusted Rodriguez with both their businesses and personal affairs, and this made her more senior than any of her colleagues at work.  However, Rodriguez was allegedly emotionally sensitive and prone to occasional "tampo" when she would be reprimanded or cited for tasks unaccomplished. She would then be absent after such reprimands and would eventually return after a few days.

Rodriguez filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, including claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Park N Ride, Vicest Phils., Grand Leisure, and the Javier Spouses.



Issue:

WON the petitioner is constructively dismissed and is entitled to full sevice incentive, leave pay and damages.



Held:

The petition is partially granted.

Respondents are ordered to pay Rodriguez the following:

1) Service incentive leave pay for the years 1984 to 2009;
2) 13th month pay differential for the years 2006 to 2008;
3) Proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2009; and
4) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the wages awarded.

All amounts awarded shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum, from the date of finality of this Decision, until fully paid.

However, the Court finds that there is constructive dismissal only when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. It exists where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer.

The affidavits of petitioner's former co-workers were mere narrations of petitioner's various duties. Far from showing the alleged harsh treatment that petitioner suffered, the affidavits rather reveal the full trust and confidence reposed by respondents on petitioner. Petitioner was entrusted with respondents' assets, the care and safeguarding of their house during their trips abroad, custody of company files and papers, and delicate matters such as the release, deposit, and withdrawals of checks from their personal accounts as well as accounts of their companies. Indeed, it was alleged that petitioner was treated by the respondents as part of the family.


Petitioner's unequivocal intent to relinquish her position was manifest when she submitted her letters of resignation. The resignation letters dated May 1, 2008 and March 25, 2009 contained words of gratitude, which could hardly come from an employee forced to resign. These letters were reinforced by petitioner's very own act of not reporting for work despite respondents' directive. / bvs

PEOPLE v. MACARAIG

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. GODOFREDO MACARAIG y GONZALES, Accused-AppellantG.R. No. 219848
June 7, 2017
Facts:At around one o'clock in the morning, Francis and Joven both decided to go home. On his way home, Francis saw appellant following Joven. Thereafter he saw appellant approach Joven from the back and stab the latter. After stabbing Joven, appellant saw Francis and ran after him. Sensing his life was in danger, Francis went inside his house, got a bolo and flashlight. He then went back outside but saw appellant run away upon seeing him.

Francis pursued appellant and caught up with him. Conscious of the possibility that appellant was armed, Francis maintained his distance. Francis asked him why he stabbed Joven, but appellant did not answer. Francis shouted for help. A friend heard his shouts and heeded his call. Appellant, on the other hand, escaped into the rice field.

Joven, despite the stab wounds, managed to get home and was able to seek help from his parents Julio and Corazon. Heles, cousin of the victim, saw Julio carrying his son outside their house. Together, they boarded Joven in a tricycle and brought him to Poblacion where they boarded an ambulance which brought them to Bicol Medical Center. On their way to the hospital, Heles asked Joven about the identity of his assailant. Joven categorically told him it was appellant. Joven however expired and was declared dead on arrival at the hospital.

Appellant, in his defense, set forth in his brief the following version of facts: that the night before the incident, Joven was throwing stones in the window of one Crobalde's house. When Macaraig told Joven to stop throwing stones, the latter left the place; that after a dinking (sic) spree, he was about to go to the house of Crobalde when two (2) unidentified men followed him and another man was waiting for him. One of the men tried to stab him with a balisong but it was the latter's companion who was hit. When he noticed that one of them was carrying a bolo, he ran away.

The RTC found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder.  Appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment of conviction arguing that the lower courts erred in convicting him of murder and in not considering his theory of self-defense.


Issues:

(1)  WON appellant acted in self-defense

(2)  WON appellant is guilty of murder.


Held:

(1)  

No.

To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC.

At the outset, appellant was uncertain as to who were the men who assaulted him and whether the victim was one of those men who allegedly attempted to stab him. Further, appellant claims that it was not him but the victim's companion who ended up stabbing him since appellant was able to evade the blows. Evidently, without a clear showing that the victim attacked or tried to attack appellant, the Court finds that unlawful aggression cannot be deemed to have occurred.

(2)  

Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery; having stabbed Joven from his back.

It is well to note that by invoking self-defense, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which he was charged. Contrary to the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, the Court finds that the prosecution sufficiently established accused-appellant's culpability. The testimonies of Francis and Dr. Tan, as well as the victim's dying declaration, undoubtedly support the version set forth by the prosecution that the accused-appellant went behind and collared Joven and then suddenly proceeded to stab him with a knife.

It bears to note that the wounds on the victim's body, particularly on the abdomen area, match the prosecution's narration of events. Moreover, Joven's statement prior to his death, naming accused-appellant as the assailant who stabbed him, proves accused-appellant's guilt of the crime charged. /bvs

AMBASSADOR HOTEL v. SSS

AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC v. SSS
G.R. No. 194137
June 21, 2017

FACTS:

SSS filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City against Ambassador Hotel, Inc. and its officers for non-remittance of SSS contributions and penalty liabilities. After preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an Information before the RTC charging Ambassador Hotel, Inc.'s Yolanda Chan (Yolanda), as Pr.

The SSS indeed conducted an investigation as to their non-remittance of contributions. He attempted to locate the records regarding their SSS contributions, but could not find any. Cordon also communicated with the SSS, but it failed to respond and instead filed the present case against them. RTC held that Yolanda could not be held criminally liable for the non-payment of SSS contributions because she was not performing the duties of the hotel's president, Aggrieved, Ambassador Hotel filed an appeal insofar as the civil liability is concerned. It alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because it was not a party in the said case.

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It held that the payment of SSS contributions is mandatory and its non-payment results in criminal prosecution. The appellate court stated that every criminal liability carries with it civil liability. As Ambassador Hotel neither waived nor reserved its right to institute a separate civil case, it was deemed instituted in the criminal case. The CA opined that the acquittal of Yolanda did not extinguish the civil action against Ambassador Hotel as the RTC did not declare that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Moreover, it underscored that Ambassador Hotel was not deprived of due process as its directors and officers were informed numerous times regarding its delinquency and the pending case filed against it. The CA concluded that Ambassador Hotel was given every opportunity to contest its obligation with the SSS yet it did nothing.


ISSUE:

W/N:Lower Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.


RULING:

Ambassador Hotel argued that it has a separate and distinct personality from its officers such as Yolanda; that it was neither a party to the criminal case nor was summons issued against it, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it; that it was deprived due process when the RTC ruled that it was civilly liable for the unpaid SSS contributions even though the trial court had no jurisdiction over its person; and that the RTC had no right to render an adverse decision against it because it was not a party in the criminal action.

PEOPLE v. BAAY

People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Baay y Falco
G.R. No. 220143
June 7, 2017


FACTS:          

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. The following are the events that led to the filing of the complaint and Information, as narrated by the victim, and her mother. Victim, testified that sometime in July 2005, she was drying palay when the accused-appellant invited her to go to the forest. Upon arrival thereat, the accused-appellant pulled down her shorts and underwear, then inserted his penis in her vagina and started a pumping motion. It lasted quite long, after which, a white liquid came out of the penis of the accused-appellant. Thereafter, she went home. After the incident. Victim  got pregnant.

On cross-examination, she testified that she practiced and was coached by her mother on what she had to say in court and to point to the accused-appellant as the one who had sex with her but in fact, the accused-appellant did not have sex with her. Mother testified that she came to know that her daughter was pregnant when she brought her to Dr. Hector Flores for a medical check-up and therein, Victim told her about the rape incident in the forest. The mother also brought Victim to Dra. Leah Florence Adicula-Sicad to assess Victim's mental/psychological status and then to the police for the purpose of filing the complaint. On April 21, 2006, Victim delivered a baby. This is Victim's second child, the first was fathered by a certain someone.

Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He testified that Victim's house is about 500 meters away from their house and that he knew that Victim is mentally retarded. He averred that he could not have raped Victim in July 2005 because from May 15 to August 30, 2005, he was working on the farm of a .certain Motet Monajan which is about one kilometer away from the forested area where the alleged crime took place. He stayed in a hut beside the said farm and bought his needs at a store near the place. He further averred that Victim 's family accused him of rape because of the trees he planted beside the pigpen owned by Victim 's family. The other defense witnesses testified on the whereabouts of accused-appellant during the month when the incident allegedly occurred to corroborate accused-appellant's testimony. In addition, Teresita Baay testified that the conflict with Victim 's family started in September 2005 when they discovered that Victim was pregnant and the latter's family was ashamed that the child to be born had no father. Also, Victim 's family has issues with accused-appellant's family because the former claimed ownership over the trees planted by the latter.

RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with Victim, a mental retardate. JONATHAN BAA Y y FALCO alias "Jun-Jun" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape which is defined and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code.


ISSUES:

WO/N: CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in convicting the accused-appellant of Statutory Rape?


RULING:

Accused-appellant faults the R TC for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping Victor. He insisted that he should be acquitted of the charge because doubts linger as to whether or not he had sex with Victim or the rape incident happened, considering Victim's conflicting responses to the queries regarding the same. The accused-appellant capitalizes on the fact that during Victim's cross-examination, the latter candidly stated that accused-appellant did not have sex with her.

Wherefore the court ruled and sustained the conviction against to the Accused-Appellant.


TETANGCO, JR. v. COA

Amando M. Tetangco, Jr., et al. Vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 215061
June 6, 2017


FACTS

This case stemmed from the COA's act of disallowing theExtraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EMEs) of the ex officio members of the Monetary Board (MBM), allegedly in violation of their respective constitutional rights.

Petitioner Amanda M. Tetangco, Jr., (Tetangco Jr.) is the Governor of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Petitioners Peter B. Favila (Favila), Juanita D. Amatong (Amatong), Nelly A. Favis-Villafuerte (Favis-Villafuerte ), Alfredo C. Antonio (Antonio) and Ignacio R. Bunye (Bunye). Were the MBM at the time that the allowance• for EMEs was approved. Petitioners Marie Michelle N. Ong (Ong), Bella M. Prudencio (Prudencio), Esmegardo S. Reyes (Reyes) and Ma. Corazon G. Catarroja (Catarroja) were employees of the BSP who participated in the processing and approval of the EME.
COA's March 23, 2010 Decision No. 2010-048, 8 on the Performance Audit Report on the allocation and utilization of EME of the MBM, stated, among others, that " x x x the ex-officio member of the Monetary Board x x x shall not be entitled to additional EMEs, other than that appropriated for him or her under the GAA as a cabinet member x x x."9
Pursuant to this Decision, COA conducted an actual audit of the specific accounts that allegedly exceeded the prescribed limitations and/or were not properly documented/justified.
As a consequence, the EMEs of MBM Neri and Favila were disallowed and became the subject of ND dated August 13, 2010. Eventually, the MBM and BSP personnel, which include the petitioners, were held personally liable under ND Nos. 10-004 GF (2007-2008) and 10- 004 GF (2007-2009).

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal with the COA Director on May 26, 2011, but the same was denied. They filed a Petition for Review 10 with the COA, but the same was likewise denied in the COA's December 23, 2013 Decision No. 2013-227. 11
With their Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in the COA's Resolution dated August 12, 2014, they filed the instant petition.
The petitioners alleged that the COA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (A) in disallowing the EMEs of the ex officio MB Ms: (1) because the March 23, 2010 COA Decision No. 2010-048, should not be applied since the disallowed EMEs were incurred by the ex officio MBMs in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, which years are prior to the date of finality (May 5, 2010) of the •said decision; (2) since as MBMs, they incur extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses in the discharge of their functions, separate and distinct from the expenses they incur in relation to their • principal office; (3) since it cannot be said that the MB Ms failed to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in approving the grant of EMEs; (4) since it violates the equal protection clause under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution; and (B) in including Petitioner Favila as one of the persons solidarily liable under ND No. 10-004 GF (2007-2008), despite the fact that he had no participation in the approval of the EMEs covered by the ND.

For its part, the COA countered that: Petitioners failed to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA in rendering its assailed Decision and subsequent Resolution; COA did not gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing the EMEs of the ex officio MBM, because the allowances were based on the applicable laws, jurisprudence, rules and regulations; the defense of good faith in approving the grant of EMEs to the ex officio MBM with reliance on BSP's independence and autonomy is unavailing; there was no violation of the equal protection clause in the subject disallowances; and petitioner Favila is solidarily liable with other officials of the BSP under ND No. 10-004 GF (2007-2009) because he was a member of the Monetary Board and also the recipient of the irregular EMEs.


ISSUE

Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the EMEs of the ex officio MBM.


HELD

No, The nature of EME, however, was not the foremost reason for the disallowance, but the limitations imposed by law in availing such allowance. the ex officio members of the Monetary Board are entitled to EMEs to the extent of that appropriated in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the ex officio members already received their EMEs from their respective Departments (as appropriated in the GAA), the additional EMEs from BSP are no longer necessary. It must be stressed that the ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office; hence, the ex officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form of compensation, allowance or other euphemism from the extended agency. we quote the pertinent discussion of the subject COA Decision: [Emphasis .Supplied.]

In fact, the ex officio membership of the cabinet member in the Monetary Board does not comprise 'another office' but rather annexed to or is required by the primary functions of his or her official position as cabinet member. Of equal significance, too, is that the ex officio member of the Monetary Board already receives separate appropriations under the GAA for EMEs, he or she being a member of the cabinet. Being such, it is highly irregular that the said ex officio member of the Monetary Board, who performs only additional duties by virtue of his or her primary functions, will be provided with additional EMEs, which in this case, appear much higher than his or her appropriations for the same expenses under the GAA as a cabinet member.


PEOPLE v OHAYAS

People of the Philippines vs. Ambrosio Ohayas, et al.
G.R. No. 207516
June 19, 2017


FACTS:

At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 31, 1996, the 12-year old victim, Armando Kyamko, Jr. (Armando, Jr.), was with his friends, 15-year old Sany and 18-year old Lou relaxing and conversing under a kalachuchi tree along •the national road in Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Sany and Lou were seated under the tree, while Armando, Jr. was standing in front of them. The distance between them was approximately one arm's length. The place where the three lads were having a conversation was illuminated by the lights coming from the house of Sany. Aside from the three lads, there were several persons in the vicinity including the father of the victim, Armando, Sr., who was then at the opposite side of the road. Suddenly, both Sany and Lou saw accused-appellant, Ohayas, a balut vendor in their place, with three other persons coming from Sitio Campo.

Accused-appellant, together with his companions, walked towards the place where the three lads were conversing. Lou noticed that accused-appellant had in his hands a shotgun while his companions were carrying torches. When accused-appellant's group was only seven arms' length away from the victim's group, accused-appellant suddenly, and without any warning, shot• Armando Jr. who was hit in his right abdomen. Not contented, accused-appellant continued to fire at the victims who were shocked by the tum of events. Sany was hit on his right finger, while Lou, although not directly hit, nevertheless suffered injuries when the bullets ricocheted. After being hit, Armando Jr. managed to call his father for help before he fell to the ground. On the other hand, Sany and Lou ran to their respective houses to seek refuge. Armando Jr. expired on the same night while still on board the vehicle on his way to Pinamungajan District Hospital.

On the following day, an autopsy was conducted by Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico-legal officer. After examination of the victim's cadaver, Dr. Cerna reduced his findings in Necropsy Report No. 96-N-109 which stated that the cause of death was shock secondary to shotgun (pellet) wounds on the body. Accused-appellant fled the day after the incident and hid for three years until he was apprehended on February 6, 1999. The defense, for its part, presented accused-appellant, Marcelina Ohayas, SP03 Socrates Bancog (SP03 Bancog), and Loreto Gines. According to the accused-appellant, he was mauled at Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan, Cebu by a certain "Toper" prior to the shooting incident, and because of that, his cousins Eddie Yaguno, Florencio Owas, Jerry Yaguno, Roberto Owas and Cerilo Bolodo wanted to avenge him. Accused-appellant, however, prevented them from doing so.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime murder.


RULING:

The elements of the crime of murder are: (I) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. In this case, these requisites have been established by the prosecution. The court denied the appeal of the accused-appellant.

CIR v. SEMIRARA MINING

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, Vs. SEMIRARA MINING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202922
June 19, 2017


FACTS:

Semirara Mining Corporation (SMC) is a duly registered and existing domestic corporation, registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a non-VAT enterprise engaged in coal mining business. It conducts business by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 972, otherwise known as the "Coal Development Act of 1976."On June 8, 1983, Semirara Coal Corporation (SCC) executed a Coal Operating Contract (COC) with the Ministry of Energy (now Department of Energy) through the Bureau of Energy Development. The term of the COC is until the year 2012. In 2002, SCC changed its corporate name to SMC, the herein petitioner. As a coal mine operator, SMC sells its coal production, under the COC, to various customers, among which is the National Power Corporation (NPC), a government-owned and controlled corporation, in accordance with the duly executed Coal Supply Agreement dated May 19, 1995. SMC has been selling coal to NPC for years without paying VAT pursuant to the exemption granted under Section 16 of PD No. 972. However, after Republic Act (RA) No. 9337, which amended certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, took effect on July 1, 2005, NPC started to withhold a tax of five percent (5%) representing the final withholding VAT on SMC's coal billings pursuant to Section 114(C) of the same law, on the belief that the sale of coal by SMC was no longer exempt from VAT.

In view thereof, SMC requested for a BIR pronouncement sustaining its position that its sale of coal to NPC was still exempt from VAT notwithstanding RA No. 9337, which the BIR granted through BIR Ruling No. 006-2007.16 Consequently, on May 21, 2007, January 21, 2008, and January 29, 2008, SMC filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Division, Revenue District Office No. 121-Quexon City, letters with supporting documents requesting for a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in the total amount of P77,253,245.39, representing the final withholding VAT withheld by NPC on its coal billing for the period of July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006. Due to the CIR's inaction, SMC filed on August 8 and November 10, 2008 its petitions for review with the CTA Division, docketed as CTA Case No. 7822 and 7849. In a Resolution dated January 27, 2009, the CTA Division consolidated CTA Case Nos. 7822 and 7849. Ruling of the CTA Division On March 28, 2011, the CTA Division rendered its Decision granting SMC's refund claim for erroneously paid final VAT withheld by NPC. The CTA Division found that SMC is exempt from VAT pursuant to Section 109(K) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended by RA No. 9337, in relation to Section 16 of PD No. 972.22 The CTA Division also found that SMC timely filed its administrative and judicial claims and submitted relevant documents in support thereof. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CTA Division's Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petitions for Review are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby DIRECTED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner in the amount of P77,253,245.39, representing the erroneously paid final VAT withheld by the National Power Corporation and remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with its sales of coal for the period covering July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006.

The CIR moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CTA Division; in a Resolution dated June 3, 2011.Undaunted, the CIR filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc, docketed as CTA EB No. 793. Ruling of the CTA En Banc In the assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc dismissed the CIR's petition for lack of merit. The CTA En Banc noted that the CIR's arguments were a mere rehash of its previous arguments already raised before, discussed and resolved by the CTA Division; thus, it found no reason to disturb the CTA Division's finding that SMC is entitled to the claimed VAT refund. On July 26, 2012, the CTA En Banc issued the assailed Resolution denying the CIR' s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.


ISSUES:

(1) Whether the CTA erred in holding that SMC is entitled to a tax credit/refund despite the latter’s failure to submit requisite documents to the BIR.
(2) Whether the CTA erred in holding that the transaction of sale or importation of coal is exempt from VAT.


HELD:

(1). No, the CTA did not erred in holding that SMC is entitled to a tax credit/refund despite the latter’s failure to submit requisite documents to the BIR.

Under G.R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015, 776 SCRA 395, Id. at 421-424; Emphasis and underscoring in the original omitted; emphasis supplied, indeed, a taxpayer's failure with the requirements listed under RMO No. 53-98 is not fatal to its claim for tax credit or refund of excess unutilized excess VAT. This holds especially true when the application for tax credit or refund of excess unutilized excess VAT has arrived at the judicial level. After all, in the judicial level or when the case is elevated to the Court, the Rules of Court governs. Simply put, the question of whether the evidence submitted by a party is sufficient to warrant the granting of its prayer lies within the sound discretion and judgment of the Court.

(2). No, the CTA did not erred in holding that the transaction of sale or importation of coal is exempt from VAT.

Under, Section 16 of PD No. 972 provides various incentives to COC operators, including tax exemptions, to wit: SEC. 16. Incentives to Operators.-The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, a contract executed under this Decree may provide that the operator shall have the following incentives: a) Exemption from all taxes except income tax; b) Exemption from payment of tariff duties and compensating tax on importation of machinery and equipment and spare parts and materials required for the coal operations subject to the following conditions:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 23, 2012 and the Resolution dated July 26, 2012 of the CTA En Banc in CT A EB No. 793 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

SPS CHUA v SACP TANSOLLANO

SPOUSES EDWIN AND GRETA CHUA, Complainants, vs. SACP TERESA BELINDA G TANSOLLANO, DCP MARIA GENE Z. JULIANDA SARMIENTO, SDCP EUFROSINO A. SULLA, SACP SUWERTE L. OFRECIOGONZALES, AND DCP JOSELITO D.R. OBEJAS, ALL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MANILA, RELATIVE TO I.S. NO. XV-07- INV-15J-05513
A.C. No. 11533
June 6, 2017

FACTS:

On October 12, 2015, Spouses Chua filed a Complaint for Perjury and False Testimony against Atty. Rudy T. Tasarra (Atty. Tasarra), Luz 0. Talusan (Talusan), Po Yi Yeung Go, Jessica W. Ang, Ricky Ang, Eden C. Uy, and Ana Tiu, before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila docketed as XV-07-INV-15J-05513. Spouses Chua alleged before the OCP of Manila that Talusan deliberately and wilfully committed perjury when •she narrated in her Complaint-Affidavits that on July 11, 2009, Spouses Chua issued 11 post-dated checks in favor of Chain Glass Enterprises, Inc. (CGEI), with an amount of P112,521.00 each, as payment for assorted glass and aluminum products. According to Spouses Chua, however, the said statement is not true because the said 11 post-dated checks were actually issued on February 23, 2009 by Greta in replacement of their previous bounced checks. Likewise, Atty. Tasarra and the members of the Board of Directors of CGEI were likewise impleaded therein for offering Talusan's testimony. In a Resolution dated December 28, 2015, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Tan-Sollano recommended the dismissal of the charges against therein respondents for lack of probable cause. The same was recommended for approval by DCP Julianda-Sarmiento and SDCP Sulla. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Spouses Chua but the same was denied in a Resolution dated August 9, 2016 issued by SACP Ofrecio-Gonzales and approved by DCP Obejas after finding no cogent reason to reverse the Resolution dated December 28, 2015 of SACP Tan-So llano. Aggrieved with such findings, Spouses Chua instituted the instant case and averred that the dismissal of XV-07-INV- l 5J-05 513 was inappropriate and highly irregular considering that the prosecution offered an "airtight case/evidence."

Ruling of the Court, After a careful review of the records of the present case, the Court finds that Spouses Chua failed to attribute clear and preponderant proof to show that the respondents committed infractions in contravention with the standards provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions against them. "In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. "Here, considering that Spouses Chua failed to present substantial proof to show the prosecutors' culpability, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that the instant administrative case was ill motivated being retaliatory in nature and aimed at striking back at them for having participated in the dismissal of XV-07-INV-15J-05513, either as investigating prosecutor or approving officer. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the prosecutors involved herein have regularly performed their official duties.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged error committed by judges/prosecutors in the exercise of their adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceeding?


HELD:

Under Atty. Amante-Descallar v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 37 (2009), an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondents Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda G. Tan-Sollano, Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-Sarmiento, Senior Deputy City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales, and Deputy City Prosecutor Joselito D.R. Obejas is DISMISSED and this case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED.

SB v CRUZ

SECURITY AND SHERIFF DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, Complainant vs. RONALD ALLAN GOLE R.CRUZ, Security Guard 1, Security and Sheriff Division, Respondent.
A.M. No. SB-17-24-P
JUNE 11, 2017


FACTS:

Security Guard 1 Ronald Allan Gole R. Cruz (CRUZ) , of the Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan, was held administratively liable (and dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from employment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations), as adjudged by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for improper solicitation, when he caused the delivery of an envelope to Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David), counsel for accused Janet Lim Napoles in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) case pending before the Sandiganbayan, purportedly to finance the Christmas Party of the Sandiganbayan’s security personnel. Atty. David handed back the said envelope containing P20,000.00 to Gole, with the knowledge of some co-security guards of the latter, who divulged the same to their Security Officer. The incident was reported to, and properly investigated by the OCA, where, from the evidence gathered, CRUZ was found guilty of improper solicitation.


ISSUE:

Whether or not solicitation of money from the counsel of a party to a case for Christmas Party, improper, and merits dismissal from work.


HELD:

YES. Improper solicitation is classified as a grave offense and is in violation of, and is punishable within, the ambit of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). Under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, solicitation is considered a prohibited act. Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor, or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor, or benefit shall influence their official actions. Soliciting is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service under Section 46 (A) of RRACCS. Court personnel’s act of soliciting or receiving money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct, and is punishable by dismissal from service.

MAPALAD, SR. v. ATTY. ECHANEZ

VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10911
JUNE 6, 2017


FACTS:

Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is a disbarment case filed by Virgilio J. Mapalad, Sr. against respondent-lawyer Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez, for failure to comply with the MCLE requirements. The respondent’s act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements, when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Canon 1, /Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified his MCLE Compliance Number. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), after thorough investigation, and careful evaluation of pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant (respondent opted not to heed the directive of the Commission to file comment and position papers), recommended that Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez be disbarred and his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?


HELD:

YES. Respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. The Lawyer’s Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client, among others. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1), he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01), he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court (Canon 10), he shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice (Rule 10.01), he owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him (Canon 17), and he shall serve his client with competence and diligence (Canon 18).

PEOPLE v. JAO

People of the Philippines Vs. Allan Jao y Calonia and Rogelio Catigtig y Cobio 
G.R. No. 225634
June 7, 2017


FACTS:

On June 2, 2008, a police team planned a buy-bust operation at Four Queens Motel located at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, after an informant notified them that accused-appellant Jao was engaged in the sale of shabu. Pursuant to the plan, four police officers checked in at Room 6 of the motel at around 5 :45 in the afternoon. Acting as poseur-buyer, the informant called Jao and ordered shabu worth P800.00 for delivery at Room 6 of the motel. When Jao arrived, the informant asked for the shabu and Jao replied by taking a plastic sachet from his waistband and handing it over to the former. The informant then executed the pre-arranged signal, prompting the policemen to arrest Jao. Six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu was recovered from Jao. While Special Investigator Marlon Manzanaris (SI Manzanaris) was about to prepare the inventory of the seized items, Jao suddenly and voluntarily informed the policemen that Catigtig was his source of contraband and agreed to cooperate for the latter's arrest. Accused-appellant Jao was then instructed to call Catigtig to order ten (10) more sachets of shabu, to which the latter agreed to deliver at around 8 o'clock that evening. Due to this development, the conduct of the inventory was suspended, and consequently, the policemen checked out of the motel and returned to their headquarters. During this time, SI Manzanaris retained custody of the items seized from Jao.

At around 7:30 in the evening, the policemen went back to the motel after Jao received a text message from Catigtig that he was already outside Room 6. Three (3) policemen then hid inside the bathroom, while Jao acted as an informant and one Senior Police Officer 2 (SP02) as the poseur-buyer. When Catigtig entered the room, Jao introduced the SP02 as the buyer of shabu, thus, prompting Catigtig to hand over a Marlboro cigarette pack containing ten (10) plastic sachets of shabu to the, who in tum, said "Okay na ni," signifying that the transaction had already taken place. The other policemen then rushed into the scene, arrested Catigtig, and frisked him, resulting in the discovery of another sachet of shabu.

The Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 30 (RTC), rendered a decision convicting accused- appellants of the crimes of Illegal Delivery and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 54 and 11,  Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 ." Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.

The CA affirmed accused- appellants' respective convictions in toto. However, after accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, the CA received a letter 24 dated February 9, 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections, stating that Catigtig had already died on August 7 , 2015.
Hence, the present petition.


ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.


HELD:

Yes. Accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. On the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 28 In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had established Jao's criminal liability for the aforesaid crimes considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic sachet containing O.Ol gram of shabu to the informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation; and (b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06gram. Similarly, both courts a quo found that there was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao as SI Manzanaris had sole possession of such sachets from the time of Jao's arrest until he turned them over to POI Tan, who in tum, handed it over to Forensic Chemist PCI Llena for qualitative examination. It is settled that "[±]actual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record." Absent any showing that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked certain facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome, their rulings must be upheld, as in this case.

In the case of Catigtig, due to his death pending appeal of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared closed and terminated.


RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER COMPLAINT v. JUDGE SAMSON

Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint Vs. Judge Divina T. Samson, etc., Compostela Valley, and Utility Worker Francisco M. Roque, Jr., etc.
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870
June 6, 2017


FACTS:

Respondent Roque was convicted for the said crime by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, Branch 1, Davao del Norte on June 1, 2005. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate with six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum penalty, including all the accessory penalties provided by law. Respondent Roque immediately applied for probation, which was granted by the RTC on July 25, 2005. Upon the motion of Probation and Parole Officer II, respondent Roque was discharged from his probation July 18, 2008. Respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in the court of respondent Judge Samson. However, in his Personal Data Sheet dated June 12, 2008, respondent did not disclosed the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of an offense.

On July 11, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Judge Divina T. Samson with misconduct for hiring co-respondent Francisco M. Roque, Jr. as Utility Worker I in her court despite knowing that respondent Roque was convicted for illegal possession of explosives, as she was the public prosecutor who handled the case, and for knowingly abetting the concealment of such fact, which led to Roque's appointment in the Judiciary. The complaint also charged respondent Roque with dishonesty and falsification for the untruthful entries he made in his Personal Data Sheet, particularly
that he had not been formally charged and convicted of an offense.

On February 15, 2016, the OCA found respondents guilty. Hence, the present petition.


ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and falsification for failing to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet that he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime charged.

(2) Whether or not respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her complicity in the appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite knowing that he was not yet discharged from probation when he applied for the position of utility worker I in her court.


HELD:

I.

Yes. Respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and falsification for failing to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet that he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime charged.

Under Section 17 of the Probation Law, the confidentiality of records of a probationer refers to the investigation report and supervision history of a probationer taken under the said law, which records shall not be disclosed to anyone other than the Probation Administration or the court concerned. However, the Probation Administration and the court concerned have the discretion to allow disclosure of the confidential records to specific persons and the government office/agency stated in the Probation Law. The confidentiality of the said records is different from respondent Roque' s obligation to answer truthfully the questions in his Personal Data Sheet, as the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government. The Personal Data Sheet is the repository of all information about any government employee and official regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Respondent Roque, therefore, had the obligation to reveal the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of a criminal offense to enable the Selection and Promotion Board for Lower Courts to correctly determine his qualification for the position applied for. The Office of the Court Administrator aptly stated that by respondent Roque' s false statement in his Personal Data Sheet making it appear that he had a spotless record, he gained unwarranted advantage over other qualified individuals, especially that he was also recommended by respondent Judge Samson for the position.

The falsification in respondent Roque' s Personal Data Sheet is a dishonest act related to his employment. Dishonesty is the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an intention to violate the truth.

II.

Yes. Respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her complicity in the appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite knowing that he was not yet discharged from probation when he applied for the position of utility worker I in her court.

Respondent Judge Samson, she contends that respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker in her court after his discharge from probation, but the records show that respondent Roque accomplished his Personal Data Sheet on June 12, 2008 or more than a month before he was discharged from probation on July 18, 2008. When respondent Roque• applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court, respondent Judge Samson knew that he was not yet discharged from probation and yet she recommended respondent Roque for the position in a recommendation letter dated June 3, 2008, which forms part of the employment record of respondent Roque in the Court. As the Presiding Judge of the Court, respondent Judge Samson should have been circumspect and waited for the final discharge of respondent Roque before she entertained his application and gave him her favorable recommendation, as it is only upon the final discharge of respondent Roque from probation that his case is deemed terminated and all his civil rights lost or suspended are restored. Her act violates Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD A VOID IMPROPRIETY AND

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01 --A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. xx xx
Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Hence, the OCA decision is hereby affirmed but modifies the recommended penalties to be imposed.


CITY OF BATANGAS v. SHELL

City of Batangas Vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation and Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
G.R. No. 195003 
June 7, 2017


FACTS: 

Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its charter, Republic Act No. 5495 (RA 5495). Under RA 5495, Batangas City constitutes a political body corporate, and is endowed with powers which pertain to a municipal corporation.9 The Sangguniang Panlungsod is the legislative body of Batangas City. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a duly organized Philippine corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and distribution of petroleum products. 10 PSPC owns and operates a refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City (Tabangao Refinery). Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. In furtherance of the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum, the Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with SPEX under which SPEX was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan. SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural gas in the Malampaya field off the shores of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya Project. The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery. 

On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which requires heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities. The RTC concluded that the power granted to the city mayor to cause the issuance of cease and desist orders against the use of ground water without prior notice and hearing constitutes a violation of the due process clause Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed separate notices of appeal from the decisions resolving the PSPC, JG Summit and First Gas petitions. On the basis of the submissions of the parties, the CA Tenth Division issued the Assailed Decision dismissing the appeal filed against PSPC and SPEX for lack of merit. 


ISSUE: 

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision which declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid.


HELD: 

The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being contrary to, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for its enactment. The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 

Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable. Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its police power. 

This claim is erroneous. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare clause. In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the control and regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city ordinance under the regime of the Water Code - a national statute governing the same subject matter. The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources. Under Article 3 thereof, water resources are placed under the control and regulation of the government through the National Water Resources Council, now the NWRB. 

In turn, the privilege to appropriate and use water is one which is exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water permits issued by the NWRB. Once granted, these water permits continue to be valid save only for reasons spelled out under the Water Code itself. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra vires. Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the other substantive requirements for a valid ordinance - i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable. While the Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the pronouncements hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy industries to be carte blanche to abuse their respective water rights at the expense of the health and safety of the inhabitants of Batangas City, the environment within which these inhabitants live, and the resources upon which these inhabitants rely. 

The Court recognizes fresh ground water as an invaluable natural resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that Batangas City is not precluded from exercising its right to protect its inhabitants from injurious effects which may result from the misuse of natural water resources within its territorial jurisdiction, should these effects later arise, provided that such exercise is done within the framework of applicable national law, particularly, the Water Code.

SPS ABOITIZ v. SPS PO

Sps. Roberto Aboitiz and Maria Cristina Cabarrus Vs. Sps. Peter L. Po and Victoria L. Po/Sps. Peter L. Po and Victoria L. Po Vs. Sps. Roberto Aboitiz, et al.
G.R. No. 208450/G.R. No. 208497 
June 5, 2017 


FACTS: 

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887, and titled under the name of Roberto Aboitiz (Roberto). The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. This parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno (Ciriaco), over a 1.0120-hectare land in Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No. 43358. This property included two (2) lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this case, Lot No. 2835. In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto." In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835 and 2807." The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim. In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision dated November 23, 2009. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected. The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the Spouses Po. However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that registered property may be reconveyed to the "rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name." The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano, during his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent buyers in good faith. The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter. They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch; it is the Court of Appeals that has this jurisdiction. The Spouses Po also filed a Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208497. They claim that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers for value." They allegedly knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax declaration had the following annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO, married to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the other. 


ISSUES: 

1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's complaint; 

2) Whether the action is barred by prescription; 

3) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply; 

4) Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case; 

5) Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property; 

6) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties; and 

7) Whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz are innocent purchasers in good faith. 


HELD: 

1) Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or possession of, real property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over the annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title. Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. 

2) "An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten [10] years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property." The basis for this is Section 53, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 in relation to Articles 1456 and 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner of a property may avail of legal remedies against a registration procured by fraud: SECTION 53. Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. – In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title ... CIVIL CODE, Art. 1456 provides: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1144(2) provides: Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (2) Upon an obligation created by law. In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is registered. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to t h e property. What is put on issue in an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is the ownership of the property and its registration. It does not question any fraudulent contract. Should that be the case, the applicable provisions are Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than three (3) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for reconveyance. 

3) There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned it. Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert the right. The elements of laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio: There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. "Laches is different from prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an issue of how much time has passed. The time period when prescription is deemed to have set in is fixed by law. Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed. When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad faith and fraud. The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of registration. Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. There was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right. Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by laches. 

4) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c): Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary Thereto. An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property. However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance. 

5) The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is fake and fraudulent. 181 They argue that this is evidenced by certifications of the document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until 18 years later. They also claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter's testimony about Mariano's sale of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco's sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax Declaration in the name of Victoria. The Regional Trial Court thus held: In this case, the Court believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the proprietary rights of the plaintiffs considering the land was already declared for taxation purposes in plaintiffs' names after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of Mariano Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of Ciriaco Seno when the latter bought the said land from his father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax declaration in the name of Ciriaco Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of plaintiffs herein. So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of Mariano Seno who are no longer the owners thereof and the tax declaration of subject land was no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano Seno. The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the effect that Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po was issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz married to Maria Cristina Cabarruz. Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their interest, will first verify from the Assessor's Office that status of said land whether it has clean title or not. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed regular and authentic. Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on. 

6) The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her interest in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties. The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court: Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. 

7) An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and fair price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. He or she buys the property believing that "the seller is the owner and could transfer the title to the property." If a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look beyond the transfer certificate of title to be considered a purchaser in good faith for value. Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states: Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record. Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone. Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined. Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. In Leong v. See: The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further." One need not inquire beyond the four comers of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property... The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social interest embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles. Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar with the history and status of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur less costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property compared to a third party. Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for the entire society. Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the property. They may rely solely on the face of the title. The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect or other circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the title of the seller. If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged to investigate beyond the face of the title. Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed a purchaser in good faith entitled to protection under the law.