REYES v OMBUDSMAN

Edwin Granada Reyes Vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan, and Paul Jocson Arches

G.R. No. 208243 

June 5, 2017 

FACTS: 

The Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance, prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly called 'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market.". 

On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010. On December 27, 2009, a fire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused extensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a complaint dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao (Ombudsman-Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance. He claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year. the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution dated March 20, 2013 and found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 

The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were public officers during the questioned acts. Both the government and private stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at the Bansalan Public Market. While the mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless, "gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors ... [to sell] firecrackers in the public market despite existing prohibition." The issuance of the mayor's permit was "patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence.".  

WHEREFORE, Office of the Ombudsman finds probable cause to indict respondents Edwin G. Reyes, Solomon A. De Castilla, Gil C. Andres, and Rita P. Domingo for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner argues that there was no probable cause, insisting that there was not enough basis for the finding of bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence in this case. 

ISSUE: 

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining that probable cause against petitioner exists. 

RULING: 

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. 

The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]" An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. 

This function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted." The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. Disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled: An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility. 

 The Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause as to whether petitioner and his co-respondents a quo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Section 3(e) provides: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 

WHEREFORE, The Office of the Ombudsman's and its Memorandum: Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in relation to Criminal Case No. SB-13-CRM- 0596 are AFFIRMED.