OCA v YU

Office of Court Administrator v. Eliza B. Yu

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813/ A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC/ A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836 (Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC)/ A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ) / OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ / OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-MTJ/ OCA IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ/ OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ/ A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821

March 14, 2017

FACTS

Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 disposing against her as follows:

The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu guilty of gross insubordination; gross ignorance of the law; gross misconduct; grave abuse of authority; oppression; and conduct unbecoming of a judicial official; and, dismisses her from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her benefits S, except accrued leave credits, and further disqualifies her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment.

In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for which she was held guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the following:

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011 The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-2011 being non-compliant with the requirements of a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII which limited the working hours for government officials and employees. There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011

2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to question the appointment of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, she was mandated to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments.. She did not also commit any act of cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who went beyond the norms of decency by her persistent application in my court harassment. Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with few words that other people find objectionable."6

3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges

It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges. She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and legal bases. Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on approval of application of leave.

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe proceedings.

6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-93.

7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.

8. Sending of inappropriate email messages The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the certification by the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name written in capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the decision were not the same messages that she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not write on the e-mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style was different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her based on assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent comments were not actionable documents. The certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender or author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-mails were not printed in the decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages without her consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in writing were guaranteed and protected by Sections.

Ruling of the Court

1. The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already exhaustively considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22, 2016.

We still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated the Lawyer's Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct. We propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment on the issues and grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent from the Judiciary, and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the ruling on the directive for her to show sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the Court.

The records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they consisted of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the several complainants as well as her own pleadings and motions which constituted proof of her administrative wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the complaints often backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by systematically exposing her personal and professional ineptitude and stilted logic. She was more than aware that the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings like these was substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable.

The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid. At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and vows not to repeat the same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in her favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules

Administrative Cases in Civil Service, which provides thus:

1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;

2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;

3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;

4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as to analogous circumstance the unsubstantiated charge;

5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;

7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;

I 0. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the unsubstantiated charge;

I 1. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the unsubstantiated charge. The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy. Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how her having medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the provision expressly recognizes other analogous circumstances, she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it would be analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for allergies could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive conduct that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints.

Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith. Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable.

Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016 the following: In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance m committing insubordination and gross misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service because she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.

2. Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent.

The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations should not also be considered grounds for her disbarment.

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

Rule 11.0 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession. However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process.

RULING:

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence. The Court deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of livelihood her disbannent is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.