PEOPLE v AMOC

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.Tito Amoc, Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 216937 

June 5, 2017 

FACTS: 

Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape in violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in two separate Informations. During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both accusations. Trial ensued thereafter. 

Prosecution witness and victim AAA narrated her tragic experience which happened in April 2009 at around 6 o'clock in the morning, when she was only thirteen years old. Accused-appellant brought her into their bedroom, took off all her clothes, tied her legs with a rope, undressed himself, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. Accused-appellant covered AAA's mouth to prevent her from asking help, pointed a knife at her and tried to stab her. AAA could not tell her mother what happened because accused-appellant was always tailing her. AAA also testified that the second sexual abuse happened on July 12, 2009. 

Accused-appellant even warned AAA not to say anything about the incident. AAA's mother, BBB, noticed that AAA's stomach had a slight bulge and conducted a pregnancy test, which yielded a positive result. AAA later on divulged that accused-appellant had been raping her and that he is the father of her baby. AAA gave birth to a baby girl sometime in December 2009. Accused-appellant admitted that he had sexual congress with AAA but argued that the same was consensual. He claimed that it was an accepted practice among the Ata-Manobo; an indigenous cultural group, to take one's daughter as a second wife. 

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape in a Decision dated July 23, 2012. 

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision with modification as to the award of damages. 

ISSUE/S: 

1) Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the element of force and intimidation; 

2) Whether or not accused-appellant’s admission of carnal knowledge of AAA does not amount to rape. 

HELD: 

No, the appeal lacks merit. There is no cogent reason to deviate from the CA ruling affirming the RTC's factual finding that the accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of rape. 

The issues raised are factual in nature. The trial court's evaluation shall be binding on this Court unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. None of the exceptions is present in this case. 

Article 266-A of the RPC provides that rape is committed:1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances; 2.) Through force, threat or intimidation. For a charge of rape under the above-mentioned provision to prosper, the following elements mus't be present: (1) accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA; and, (2) he accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation. The first element of carnal knowledge is present because accused appellant, in fact, admits that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. The point of contention is whether there was force, or intimidation, or threat in the said act. We find that the evidence on record sufficiently established that the accused-appellant employed force, intimidation and threat in carrying out his sexual advances on AAA. 

The CA correctly found that the accused-appellant employed force upon the person of AAA. Accused-appellant tied AAA's legs with a rope, climbed on top of her, and covered her mouth to prevent her from asking for help. Accused-appellant also threatened AAA when he pointed a knife at her and tried to stab her. Clearly, contrary to the accused-appellant's contention, the element of force and intimidation is present in this case. And even assuming that AAA failed to resist, the same does not necessarily amount to consent to accused-appellant's criminal acts. It is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; as moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. Jurisprudence holds that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim's lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. In the cases of People v. Ofemaniano and People v. Corpuz, it has been acknowledged that even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral ascendancy over the victim. Considering that accused-appellant was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, and as such, he was exercising parental authority over AAA. Indeed, in this case, moral ascendancy is substituted for force and intimidation. As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA, this can hardly affect the credibility of AAA. 

As a general rule, on the question of whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed. 

It is settled in this jurisdiction that as long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as a whole, discrepancies of minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity, or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses' declarations. Also, in prosecuting a crime of rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Moreover, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi cannot stand against the prosecution's evidence. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, he must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused-appellant failed in this regard. Lastly, the Informations alleged that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of AAA. 

The evidence, however, shows that the accused-appellant was merely the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, BBB. There was no evidence adduced to prove that accused-appellant was legally married to BBB. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that it was proven during trial that accused-appellant was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, the same cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged in the Informations. The circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the Informations and proved during trial to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape. 

Therefore, the SC find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA for the conviction of accused-appellant for two counts of simple rape as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence on record.