SHELL v. COC

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs

G.R. No. 195876

June 19, 2017

FACTS:

The omnibus motion is anchored primarily on the alleged applicability of Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs to the case at bar. However, the court desisted from applying the doctrine laid down in Chevron considering that the facts and circumstances therein are not in all fours with those obtaining in the instant case. Thus, Chevron is not a precedent to the case at bar. The facts and circumstances between the jurisprudence relied upon and the pending controversy should not diverge on material points. But as clearly explained in the assailed December 5, 2016 decision, the main difference between Chevron and the case at bar lies in the attendance of fraud. In Chevron, evidence on record established that Chevron committed fraud in its dealings. On the other hand, proof that petitioner Pilipinas Shell was just as guilty was clearly wanting. Simply there was no finding of fraud on the part of petitioner in the case at bar. In his dissent, Associate Justice Peralta claims that fraud was committed by the petitioner when it allegedly deliberately incurred delay in filing its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration in order to avail of the reduced tariff duty on oil importations, but as exhaustively discussed in December 5, 2016 decision. The document was never formally offered as evidence before the Court of Tax Appeals, therefore, bereft of evidentiary value. Resultantly, no scintilla of proof was ever offered in evidence by respondent Commissioner of Customs to substantiate the claim that Pilipinas Shell acted in fraudulent manner. The allegations of fraud on the part of Pilipinas Shell is mere conjecture and purely speculative. In the case at bar, petitioner filed its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration and paid the import duty of its shipments on May 23, 1996. However, it only received a demand letter from public respondent on July 27, 2000, or more than 4 years later. By this time, the one-year prescriptive period had already elapsed. Justice Peralta and the respondent claim that the government is no longer collecting tariff duties. Rather, it is exercising its ownership right over the shipments, which were allegedly deemed abandoned by petitioner because of the latter’s failure to timely file the IEIRD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner acted in fraudulent manner for ipso facto abandonment doctrine be applied?

HELD:

No. Public respondent cannot harp on the Chevron ruling to excuse compliance from the due notice requirement before the imported articles can be deemed abandoned, for to do so would only downplay the Court’s finding anent the non-attendance of fraud. It becomes abundantly clear that the notice requirement as mandated in CMO 15-94 cannot be excused unless fraud is established. Fraud being absent on the part of petitioner Pilipinas Shell, the ipso facto abandonment doctrine cannot operate within the factual milieu of the instant case.