PJ LHUILLIER, INC. v. CAMACHO

PJ Lhuillier, Inc. Vs. Hector Oriel Cimagala Camacho
G.R. No. 223073

February 22, 2017

Facts:   

           On July 25, 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the "Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra (Vizcarra) as PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop operations and respondent Hector Oriel Cimagala Camacho (Camacho) as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area.

On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan. On May 18, 2012, Vizcarra issued a show cause memorandum directing Camacho to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating PJLI's Code of Conduct and Discipline which prohibited the bringing along of non-employees during the QTP operations. Camacho, in his Memorandum, apologized and explained that the violation was an oversight on his part for lack of sleep and rest. With busy official schedules on the following day, he requested his mother's personal driver, Jose Marasigan (Marasigan) to drive him back to Pangasinan. He admitted that Marasigan rode with him in the service vehicle during the QTP operations.

On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of Formal Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged.

Issue:  

             Whether or not Hector Camacho was illegally dismissed.

Held:  

Security of Tenure v. Management Prerogative

To begin with, it is well to recognize the Court's discussion in Jmasen Philippine Manufacturing Corp., v. Alcon, on security of tenure viz-a-viz management prerogative, to wit:

The law and jurisprudence guarantee to every employee security of tenure. This textual and the ensuing jurisprudential commitment to the cause and welfare of the working class proceed from the social justice principles of the Constitution that the Court zealously implements out of its concern for those with less in life. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to strike down as invalid any employer act that attempts to undermine workers' tenurial security. All these the State undertakes under Article 279 (now Article 293) of the Labor Code which bar an employer from terminating the services of an employee, except for just or authorized cause and upon observance of due process.

In protecting the rights of the workers, the law, however, does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. The constitutional and legal protection equally recognize the employer's right and prerogative to manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.

Accordingly, except as limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own judgment and discretion, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, worker supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. As a general proposition, an employer has free reign over every aspect of its business, including the dismissal of his employees as long as the exercise of its management prerogative is done reasonably, in good faith, and in a manner not otherwise intended to defeat or circumvent the rights of workers.

Loss of Trust and Confidence

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an employee for committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the employer on the employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employees. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not be loosely applied in justifying the termination of an employee. Certain guidelines must be observed for the employer to cite loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination. Loss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith." For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for termination, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against justifies the loss of trust and confidence.

The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.

He was primarily responsible for administering and controlling the operations of branches in his assigned area, ensuring cost efficiency, manpower productivity and

competitiveneness. He was also responsible for overseeing/monitoring the overall security and integrity in the area, including branch personnel safety, in coordination with PJLI's Security Services Division. In fact, as stated by the CA, his position required the utmost trust and confidence as it entailed the custody, handling, or care and protection of PJLI's property. Furthermore, as AOM, he was among those employees authorized to participate in the QTP operations. He was tasked in overseeing the safe transport and handling of company assets during the said operations.

Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a managerial position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting work ethics" and should live up to this high standard of responsibility."

Simply put, his act was without justification. For this transgression, petitioner P JLI was placed in a difficult position of withdrawing the trust and confidence that it reposed on respondent Camacho and eventually deciding to end his employment. "Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost is difficult, if not impossible, to regain." P JLI cannot be compelled to retain Camacho who committed acts inimical to its interests. A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection.

Finally, although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account of Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the consequence of his misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate the respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed on him by his employer.