GUYAMIN v FLORES

Rodante Guyamin, et.al,Petitioners, vs. Jacinto Flores and Maximo Flores represented by Ramon Flores, Respondents

G.R. No. 202189

April 25, 2017

FACTS:

In 2006, respondents Jacinto G. Flores and Maximo G. Flores, represented by their brother and attorney-in-fact Ramon G. Flores, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners Rodante F. Guyamin, Lucinia F. Guyamin, and Eileen G. Gatarin. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of a 984-square meter lot in General Trias, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and that petitioners are their relatives who for many years have been occupying the subject property by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors and parents, the original owners of the same; that petitioners have been "reminded to vacate the premises because respondents have decided to sell the property; that petitioners failed to vacate; that respondents made several attempts to settle the matter through conciliation before the Punong Barangay but the same proved futile; that the Punong Barangay was constrained to issue a Certification To File Action; that respondents were thus compelled to file the Complaint and incur legal expenses, for which they pray that petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs.

On September 25, 2006, summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners through Eileen, who nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. Respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, arguing that despite service of summons, petitioners failed to file their answer. On May 28, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss. On June 5, 2007, respondents filed their Reply to Answer, arguing that petitioners' Answer was belatedly filed, which is why they filed a motion to declare petitioners in default; and prayed that the Answer be stricken off the record. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs which was in turn reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity;

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the defendants in default and proceeding to receive plaintiffs' evidence ex-parte; and

3. Whether or not the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it rendered its Decision favorable to the plaintiffs prior or without the filing of the plaintiffs' Formal Offer of Evidence.

HELD:

No, the court held in the negative. It noted that petitioners raise purely procedural questions and nothing more. In other words, petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure technicality. As owners, respondents' substantive rights must be protected in the first instance; they cannot be defeated by a resort to procedural hairsplitting that gets the parties nowhere. The Court will not pretend to engage in a useless discussion of the virtues of adhering strictly to procedure, when to do so would promote a clear injustice and violation of respondents' substantive rights. More so when the result would be the same, that is, petitioners would eventually and ultimately lose their case.

Regarding the claim of improper service of summons, the record reveals that the contrary is true. The court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006 exists, and must be presumed regular. The mere fact that the RTC, and even the respondents, requested at different stages in the proceedings that summons be served once more upon petitioners does not prove that the service thereof made on September 25, 2006 was invalid; it only means that the court and parties desire the service of summons anew which was clearly unnecessary. The claim that Lucinia was then abroad is of no moment either; there is no evidence to support this self-serving claim.The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, .a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.

Finally, the Court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were presented and marked during the ex parte hearing of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were incorporated into the records of the case. As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in his October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were not included in the record, the RTC Judge could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.

While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Considering that there was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in this case is more in keeping with the constitutional mandate to secure social justice.

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to the instant case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation