PARAS v PARAS

Roxas Yap Paras, Complainant  -Versus - Justo De Jesus Paras, Respondent

A.C. No. 5333

March 13, 2017

Resolution

This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint 1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension order and ( b) whether his suspension should be lifted.

The Facts

In a Decision 2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for falsifying hiswife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously. 3 Respondent moved for reconsideration 4 but the Court denied it with finality in a Resolution 5 dated January 22, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion 6 to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo ), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty.

Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order. 7 Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order. 8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion for contempt and disbarment, 9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments, 13 and complainant filed her replies 14 to both comments.

Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension 15 dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension. 16 Also, complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.

17 On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order 18 on the status of respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his suspension. 19 Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant(OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter 20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation. 21 In a Report and Recommendation 22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court. 23 Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and ( b) considering that the suspensions were to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002. 24 To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.

In a Resolution 34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one ( 1) year. 35 Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 36 alleging that his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.

The Issues

whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he was suspended; and whether the Court should lift his suspension. The Court's Ruling

Ruling

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant - which was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.

Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons, 38 as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. 39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings. 40 However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.

According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." 41 During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. 42 It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. 43 The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. 44 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case - are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, 46 to wit Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully. appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 2001 51 and indicating therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order. Complainant's contention is untenable. As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit. As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six ( 6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed. The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.