AALA v. UY

CRISANTO M. AALA v. REY T. UY

GR No. 202781

January 10, 2017

Facts:

On July 12, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City's Committee on Finance conducted a public hearing for the approval of a proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance sought to adopt a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. It then passed City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An Ordinance Approving the New Schedule of Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level of Real Properties in the City of Tagum. The ordinance was approved by Mayor Rey T. Uy (Mayor Uy) on November 11, 2011 and was immediately forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte for review.

On February 7, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement issued a report dated February 1, 2012 declaring City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011 valid. It also directed the respondents to revise the ordinance based on the recommendations of the Provincial Assessor's Office. Consequently, petitioners returned it to the respondents for modification. As a result of the amendments introduced to City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, on March 19, 2012, the respondents passed City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 and was approved by Mayor Uy on April 10, 2012. It was then transmitted for review to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte. The petitioners received the proposed ordinance on April 12, 2012.

On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido), both residents of Tagum City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. It was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement. The Committee conducted a hearing to tackle the matters raised in the Opposition.

In their Opposition/Objection,  Aala and Ferido asserted that City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 violated Sections 130(a), 198(a) and (b), 199(b),  and 201 of the Local Government Code of 1991. They alleged that Sections III C 1, 2, and 3 as well as Sections III G 1(b) and 4(g) of the proposed ordinance divided Tagum City into different zones, classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending on where they were situated without taking into account the "distinct and fundamental differences ... and elements of value" of each property.

Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified and valued those properties located in a predominantly commercial area as commercial, regardless of the purpose to which they were devoted. According to them, this was erroneous because real property should be classified, valued, and assessed not according to its location but on the basis of actual use. Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed ordinance imposed exorbitant real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City could not afford to pay.

After the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement issued Committee Report No.5 dated May 4, 2012, which returned City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 to the respondents. The petitioners also directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City to give attention and due course to the oppositors' concerns.

On May 22, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City issued Resolution No. 808, s-2012 dated May 14, 2012, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte to reconsider its position on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte issued Resolution No. 428 declaring as invalid Sections III C 1, 2, and 3, Sections III D (1) and (2), and Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012.

However, on July 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City passed Resolution No. 874, s-2012 declaring City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 as valid.  It argued that te Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte failed to take action on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 within 30 days from its receipt on April 12, 2012. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 enjoys the presumption of validity.

On July 13, 2012, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 was published in the July 13-19, 2012 issue of Trends and Time, a newspaper of general circulation in Tagum City.

Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, petitioners filed before this Court an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on August 13, 2012.  The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have raised.

Issue: 

Whether or not the petitioners comply with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedy?

Held: 

No. The Supreme Court denies the Petition for serious procedural errors. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter," it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."

As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus."However, this Court has emphasized that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed.

There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.  The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner."

Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were established for a reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause.