LAYGO vs. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOLANO, NUEVA VIZCAYA

RODOLFO LAYGO and WILLIE LAYGO, Petitioners, vs. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOLANO, NUEVA VIZCAYA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188448

January 11, 2017

FACTS:

The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103922 and its Resolution dated June 19, 2009.

In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago O. Dickson and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls No. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government. Bandrang claimed that petitioners told her to vacate the stalls, which they subsequently subleased to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify against petitioners if need be, and appealed that she be given priority in the future to lease the stalls she vacated.

In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution No. 183-2004 to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the jurisdiction of his office since it (Sanggunian) has already passed and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market.

Mayor Dickson, in response, informed the Sanggunian that the stalls were constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the Sanggunian if provisions were made to sanction lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against subleasing (Item No. 9) in the contract of lease.

Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sanggunian, praying and recommending to Mayor Dickson, by way of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing. She suggested that after which, the stalls can be bided upon anew and leased to the successful bidder. She made the suggestion because Mayor Dickson did not act on her concerns even after the Sanggunian referred them to him. 

The Sanggunian once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of Resolution No. 183-2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sanggunian opined that they no longer need to make any recommendation to Mayor Dickson because Resolution No. 183-2004 already empowered and authorized him to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent provisions.

Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the Sanggunian. Thus, Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus against him before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC). Subsequently, she amended her petition to implead petitioners. Bandrang alleged that despite already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of petitioners with the Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the performance and enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, she sought an order directing Mayor Dickson to immediately cancel the lease between the Municipal Government and petitioners over Public Market Stall Nos. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, and to lease the vacated stalls to interested persons.

In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, Mayor Dickson claimed that under the principle of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court as she was guilty herself in leasing the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by referring the matter to the Sanggunian for appropriate action. He also argued that Bandrang had no cause of action against him and that she was not a real-party-in-interest. He likewise asserted that the subject of the mandamus was not proper as it entailed an act which was purely discretionary on his part.

In his Pre-Trial Brief, Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because the stalls were on a BOT scheme covered by an ordinance. During the hearing, Mayor Dickson presented a copy of the resolution of the Sanggunian indicating that there was a directive to all stall owners in the public market of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to build their own stalls after a fire gutted the public market.

On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A and B. They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by virtue of a BOT scheme of the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with Bandrang, it was agreed that the contract was subject to the consent of the other heirs of Clarita. The consent, however, was never given; hence, there was no subleasing to speak of. Even on the assumption that there was, petitioners maintained that the prohibition on subleasing would not apply because the contract between the Municipality and Clarita was one under a BOT scheme. Resolution No. 183-2004 only covered stall holders who violated their lease contracts with the Municipal Government. Since their contract with the Municipal Government was not a lease contract but a BOT agreement, Resolution No. 183-2004 would neither apply to them, nor be enforced against them. Further, even granting arguendo that the prohibition would apply, petitioners claimed that there was no more ground for the revocation of the lease because the subleasing claimed by Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by the Municipality of payments ratified the contract with petitioners.

On July 23, 2007, the RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then incumbent mayor Hon. Philip A. Dacayo (Mayor Dacayo) as respondent in place of Mayor Dickson.

Bandrang filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 8, 2008 arguing that no genuine factual issues existed to necessitate trial. Bandrang reiterated the violation of petitioners against subletting in their lease contracts with the Municipal Government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not mandamus is proper
2. Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be applied against petitioners despite the absence of a contract of lease between them and the Municipal Government

RULING:

1. No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person bas unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. Neither will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in nature.

Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be done are discretionary in nature.

2.Yes. There is preponderant evidence that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government is one of lease. The type of contract existing between petitioners and the Municipal Government is disputed. The Municipal Government asserts that it is one of lease, while petitioners insist that it is a BOT agreement. Both parties, however, failed to present the contracts which they purport to have. It is likewise uncertain whether the contract would fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds and would, thus, be only proven through written evidence. In spite of these, we find that the Municipal Government was able to prove its claim, through secondary evidence, that its contract with petitioners was one of lease.

 In view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED the previous decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Mandamus against Mayor Santiago O. Dickson is DISMISSED.