OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GUTIERREZ

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. LETICIA BARBARA B. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 189100
June 21, 2017


Facts:

On October 25, 2002, the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), through its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) composed of chairperson Christina dela Cruz and members Ma. Theresa Icabales, Rosemarie Juafio, Corazon Bartolome, and Ma. Florita Gabuna, issued an Invitation to Bid for the procurement of a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Projector. The said bidding was declared a failure because the price offered by the two (2) bidders, Advance Solutions and Gakken Phils. (Gakken), were higher than the recommended price of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Thus, on November 2, 2002, a second round of bidding was conducted, which was participated in by Linkworth International, Inc. (Linkworth). But again, the bidding was declared a failure because the price offered by Linkworth exceeded the DBM's recommended amount.

Due to the failure of the biddings, the BF AD decided to enter into negotiated contracts by way of canvas and based on the end-users' preference. Thereafter, Linkworth and Gakken submitted their respective quotations and conducted product demonstrations before the BAC, the BF AD Secretariat, and the end-users: the Supply Section and the Office of the Deputy Director, National Drug Policy (NDP). Upon conclusion of the demonstrations, the Deputy Director of the NDP allegedly informed the BAC that it preferred the product offered by Gakken. On January 15, 2003, a new BAC was formed, composed of Jesusa Joyce N. Cinmay (Cinmay) as chairperson, and Leonida M. Castillo, Marle B. Koffa, Nemia T. Getes, and Emilio L. Polig, Jr. as members. Then, on July 16, 2003, the BFAD, through Gutierrez, then Director of the BF AD, issued a Notice of Award to Linkworth for three (3) units of LCD Projectors for the aggregate amount of P297 ,000, which notice the supplier received through facsimile. Further, the notice required Linkworth to signify its conformity and to post a performance bond equivalent to 5 of the total price. However, when the representative from Linkworth tried to tender the required bond in the amount of ₱14,850 on July 25, 2003, the agency refused to accept the same. Linkworth, thus, wrote to respondent asking for an explanation.

Despite having acknowledged receiving the letter from Linkworth on July 31, 2003, no written response was given by respondent. Gutierrez merely informed Linkworth that the agency will investigate the matter. Linkworth then sought the assistance of a law firm to look into the anomaly, and it was only then when it found out that it was allegedly awarded the procurement project by mistake. According to respondent, it was Gakken that actually won the award for the supply as shown by the July 10, 2003 Resolution of the BAC, unanimously approved by the new BAC composition. Linkworth was then advised by Gutierrez to disregard the Notice of Award earlier made in its favor. This led to the filing of administrative charges against respondent and the members of the two BAC’s for grave misconduct.

On February 27, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct. Insofar as respondent is concerned, the CA, on June 16, 2009, reversed the findings of the Ombudsman.

Primarily, petitioner bases its motion to intervene on the catena of cases it cited in its Omnibus Motion. It reiterates that as the constitutionally mandated disciplining body, it has the authority to defend its rulings on appeal, and that it had been allowed to do so via intervention before judicial authorities. As a party directly affected by the ruling rendered by the CA, it has sufficient legal interest to intervene, so the Ombudsman claims.

More importantly, petitioner argues that its rulings were supported by substantial evidence on record. Conspiracy, according to petitioner, does not require direct evidence to be proven. Here, respondent's role as a coconspirator was established through her signature in the Notice of Award. The Arias doctrine could not exonerate respondent from liability, in view of the difference in factual milieu compared with the case at bar. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed had been overturned since there is evidence to the contrary.


Issue:

Whether or not the the appellate court erred in denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion.


Ruling:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has resolved
Preliminarily, the Court rules that petitioner has legal standing to intervene. Based on the citations by both parties, it would appear that jurisprudence on this point has been replete, but erratic. A survey of the Court's pertinent rulings must then be made to shed light on this conundrum.
In earlier years, an exoneration from an administrative case is akin to an acquittal in a criminal action-both results are not subject to appeal. This is brought about not by the existence of a bar in administrative cases similar to double jeopardy; rather, this is based on the basic premise that appeal is not a statutory right, but a privilege. Of relevance are Secs. 37 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807 which then provided:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. Section 39. Appeals. Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days

Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her, or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. However, intervention is not a matter of right, but is instead addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. It may be permitted only when the statutory conditions for the right to intervene are shown. Otherwise stated, the status of the Ombudsman as a party adversely affected by the CA's assailed Decision does not automatically translate to a grant of its motion to intervene. Procedural rules must still be observed before its intervention may be allowed.
Verily, aside from (1) having legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) having legal interest in the success of any of the parties; (3) having an interest against both parties; (4) or being so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof, the movant must also be able to interpose the motion before rendition of judgment, pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 19. It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive onlooker.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The June 16, 2009 Decision and July 23, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107 5 51 are hereby AFFIRMED.


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