PEOPLE v. DESCARTIN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE DESCARTIN JR. Y MERCADER

G.R. NO. 215195

JUNE 7, 2017

FACTS:

AAA testified that accused-appellant is her father and that she has 3 other younger sisters. They rented a house in Davao City with Frigem Almocera who rented a room therein, while her mother was working in Manila. On the evening of July 19, 2003, after watching television, AAA went to sleep in the sala of their house with her three younger sisters, while Almocera was sleeping in his room. Accused-appellant then arrived from a drinking spree in their neighbor's house. Upon arriving, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and panty, and raised AAA's right leg but the latter lowered the same to prevent accused-appellant from raping her. However, accused-appellant was still able to successfully insert his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain and could only cry in silence. AAA failed to wake up her siblings or shout for help while her father was raping her because she was afraid of her father and she could not move her hands anymore. When accused-appellant was finished, he wiped the semen from his pants and put back AAA's shorts. The next day, July 20, 2003, AAA together with Almocera, went to their neighbor, Virginia Capote. AAA then confided to Capote that accused-appellant raped her. Upon hearing the story, Capote brought AAA to the Davao Medical Center Women and Protection Unit for medical examination. Thereafter, Capote accompanied AAA to the Sasa Police

Station to report the incident.

On June 13, 2011, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Qualified Rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

That the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the appellant of the offense charged notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The Court strictly concurs about the rule is settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are accorded finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" - all of which, are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA.

In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that AAA's testimony was straight, candid, spontaneous and steadfast even on cross examination. Thus, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule, since the accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that the RTC and the CA overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of weight and substance that would alter the assailed Decision.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Whereas, Article 266-B of the RPC provides the penalties for the crime of rape:

Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.

To raise the crime of rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur.

In the present case, the elements of qualified rape were sufficiently alleged in the Information, to wit: a) AAA was 11 years old on the day of the alleged rape; and b) accused-appellant is AAA's father. The foregoing elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. That AAA was 11 years old during the commission of the rape and that accused-appellant is AAA's father were established by AAA's Certificate of Live Birth.

In People v. Canoy, We held that it is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not been aggrieved. The foregoing legal dictum especially applies in this case, since accused-appellant failed to prove any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge. The allegation of the accused-appellant that he could not have summoned enough courage to molest AAA knowing the danger that he will be caught considering that AAA's three siblings were beside her when the alleged rape occurred, and Almocera was just sleeping in the other room, is without merit.

In People v. Villamor, AAA's silence and failure to shout or wake up her siblings do not affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found that there is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. While there are some who may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and attempt to move on with their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror, for the perpetrator in these cases, sued as the victim's father, is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.

Since the elements of minority of AAA and the relationship of the accused-appellant with AAA were alleged in the Information and sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A paragraph l (d), as qualified under Article 266-B of the RPC.

Thus, the CA is correct in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Thus, the Court increases the award of civil indemnity from PhP75,000 to PhP100,000; moral damages from PhP75,000 to PhP100,000; and, exemplary damages from PhP30,000 to PhP100,000. Digested by jsg.