SANTOS-YLLANA REALTY CORPORATION VS. SPOUSES RICARDO & FLORENTINA DEANG
G.R. NO. 190043
JUNE 21, 2017
FACTS:
Respondent Florentina Deang, doing business under the name and style of "Rommel Dry Goods," is a former lessee of Stall No. H-6 at Santos-Yllana Shopping Center, which is located on Miranda Street, Angeles City, Pampanga, and owned and operated by petitioner since 1975. Due to Florentina's failure to pay her rents and other charges due on the rented stall, petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages against respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City on August 11, 1997. The case was raffled to Branch 1 of the Angeles City MTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-311. On October 16, 1997, the MTC rendered a Decision based on a Compromise Agreement that the parties executed.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of the October 16, 1997 Decision due to Florentina's failure to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. Respondents objected, alleging that the amount due to petitioner had already been paid in full. After resolving the objections, the Angeles City MTC issued an Order on February 20, 1998 granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution, and the same was accordingly issued.
Respondents moved to quash the Writ of Execution on February 26, 1998. On even date, Sheriff Allen Sicat of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City implemented the Writ of Execution and padlocked respondents' stall. The stall, however, was ordered reopened by the MTC within the same day due to the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration. During the hearings on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents reiterated their claim that they had already paid the rental arrearages and other fees and charges due to petitioner; hence, the Motion for Execution should be rendered moot and academic. On June 3, 1998, the Angeles MTC issued an Order upholding the Writ of Execution and commanding the sheriff to immediately implement the same. Consequently, on June 5, 1998, Daniel Pangan, Sheriff III of the MTC, implemented the writ and padlocked respondents' stall.
Whereas, on June 5, 1998, the undersigned implemented the said Writ of Execution by padlocking the subject premises in question located at H-6 Santos-Yllana Shopping Center, Miranda St., Angeles City, together with the representative of the petitioner on the same date, the undersigned officially turned-over the subject premises to the plaintiff, duly acknowledged receipt by the plaintiff's representative, Juanita de Nucum. Aggrieved by the implementation of the Writ of Execution, respondents filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Injunctive Relief against petitioner and Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan before the Manila RTC, Branch 44, alleging that the Writ of Execution was illegally implemented. They claim to have suffered damages as a result of the illegal closure of their stall since important documents, checks, money, and bank books, among others, were locked inside the stall and could not be retrieved, thereby preventing them from operating their business, and causing their business to suffer and their goodwill to be tarnished. Respondents, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner to pay them P500,000 as actual damages, P250,000 as moral damages, P250,000 as exemplary damages, and Pl00,000 as attorney's fees, plus P3,000 per appearance fee per hearing.
Accordingly, the RTC of Manila, Branch 44 rendered a Decision, finding for respondents and adjudged petitioner, as well as Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan, jointly and severally liable for the damages being claimed. The trial court disposed of the case in this wise:
1. Actual damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos;
2. Moral Damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos;
3. Exemplary Damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos;
4. Attorney's Fees in the amount of Pl00,000.00, plus P3,000.00 appearance fee;
5. Plus costs of suit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the ruling on appeal.
Echoing the observation of the RTC, the CA found that the sheriffs failed to observe the notice requirement mandated under Section 10 (c) 13 of Rule 39 in the implementation of the Writ of Execution. The CA ruled that regardless of whether petitioner was adjudged rightfully entitled to the possession of the stall, the sheriffs are mandated to observe due process prescribed in the afore-stated Rule in ejecting respondents. The appellate court, however, relieved petitioner from any fault arising out of the manner of implementation of the Writ of Execution. Aside from being the successful party-litigant in the ejectment case, the CA noted that there was no showing that petitioner was complicit with the sheriffs' implementation of the Writ. Despite the foregoing findings, the CA adjudged petitioner liable for damages to respondents. Except for the actual damages awarded, which were found to be unsubstantiated, the CA sustained the rest of the damages awarded by the trial court with modification in that the award for actual damages is hereby deleted for insufficiency of evidence and the award for moral damages is reduced from P250,000.00 to Pl00,000.00; the exemplary damages, from P250,000.00 to PI00,000.00 and the attorney's fees, from PI00,00.00 to P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the moral and exemplary damages awarded, including attorney's fees, despite its finding that petitioner had no participation in the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
- HELD:
The Court finds that the petition is meritorious. The joint and solidary liability of petitioner has no factual and legal basis. It is undisputed that petitioner succeeded in securing a favourable judgment in the ejectment case; therefore, it was well within its right to move for the execution of the MTC's Decision pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The rule allows for the immediate execution of judgment in the event that judgment is rendered against the defendant in an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case, provided that certain conditions are met:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersede as bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersede as bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Petitioner clearly elected to exercise its right under the aforestated provision, thus, its move to execute the MTC judgment enjoys the disputable presumption under Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that it obeyed the applicable law and rules in doing so.
We have, in Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. vs. Usec. Trinidad Lichauco, elucidated that "a civil complaint for damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would serve as basis for the award of damages." As such, it was incumbent upon respondents to overcome the aforestated presumption and to prove that petitioner abused its rights and willfully intended to inflict damage upon them before they can claim damages from the former. Otherwise, having the sole prerogative to move to execute the judgment, the disputable presumption that petitioner is innocent of wrongdoing against respondents prevails.
A reading of the RTC's judgment shows that it was not conclusively proved that petitioner committed bad faith or connived with the sheriffs in the implementation of the Writ.
Moreover, no less than the CA, in the body of its Decision, absolved petitioner from any fault and participation in the injury inflicted upon respondents by reason of the haphazard implementation of the Writ of Execution. The CA said: Having enforced the writ of execution with undue haste and without giving respondents the required prior notice and reasonable time to vacate the subject stall, it is then safe to say that defendants-appellants sheriffs had indeed run afoul to the mandate of Section 10 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As a result, respondents suffered damages and the reputation of the judicial system is sullied by the isolated acts of a few (Deang vs. Sicat, 446 SCRA 22, 32 2004).
On this score, the Court cannot ascribe any fault on the part of petitioner-corporation as to the manner of implementing the writ. As it is, the said corporation is the winning party in the ejectment case. Just like any others, it only desired the immediate execution of the judgment of the court, which was rendered favorable to them. Records is bereft of any showing that defendant-appellant had a hand in the non-compliance with the notice requirement mandated by law.
The CA's own categorical finding, as embodied and discussed in the body of the adverted decision, negates any liability on the part of petitioner to compensate respondents for the injuries they suffered due to the misconduct and culpability of Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan, for which they were accordingly administratively charged and disciplined. To hold petitioners liable for damages, despite having been categorically absolved, is manifestly unjust and inequitable.
As discussed, the culpable act or omission on the part of petitioner that resulted in injury to respondents was not factually established.
The Court likewise cannot sustain the judgment affirming petitioner's liability for exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and cost of suit. Anent the liability of petitioners for attorney's fees and cost of suit, the same must similarly be deleted in light of the reversal of judgment as to them.
Regrettably, the execution of the MTC judgment was tainted with irregularities that resulted in damage to respondents. Nevertheless, under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. Petitioner must not bear the brunt of the sheriffs' misconduct in the absence of evidence that the latter acted upon its instructions to ignore the rules of procedure in implementing the Writ. Anent the liability of Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan to respondents, records do not disclose if the former questioned the Decision of the CA before this Court. As such, the judgment against them stands.
The petition is hereby granted by the Court. The June 17, 2009 Decision and October 13, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65768 are hereby affirmed with modification. The joint and solidary liability of petitioner Santos-Yllana Realty Corporation is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. Digested by jsg.
No comments:
Post a Comment