NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO CARANDANG y PRESCILLA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177000
JUNE 19, 2017
FACTS:
In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, SP02 Estelito Andaya, P02 Carandang and SPO1 Garcia set off for Sitio Mahabang Buhangin in Tanauan, Batangas to conduct their routine as peace officers of the area on board a patrol car driven by SPO1 Garcia. While they were in Barangay Gonzales waiting for a boat that would bring them to Sitio Mahabang Buhangin, they heard successive gunshots apparently coming from Barangay Boot. P/C Insp. Camacho then decided to proceed to Barangay Boot to check and to apprehend those who were illegally discharging their firearms. At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed SP02 Andaya and P02 Carandang to join the religious procession to monitor those who will indiscriminately fire guns. As they were moving on with the procession, they heard successive gunshots, which they determined to have emanated from the backyard of Silveria Guelos. They went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to report to P/C Insp. Camacho what they found out. Acting upon their report, P/C Insp. Camacho decided to go with them to the place of Silveria. In going to the house, they rode a passenger jeepney in order to conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their patrol car and followed them. Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in, P/C Insp. Camacho, P02 Carandang and SP02 Andaya then proceeded to the back of the house where they saw around 15 persons drinking liquor. They also noticed empty shells of armalite rifle scattered on the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then introduced himself as the Chief of Tanauan Police Station and told the group that he and his men were verifying who fired the shots. Someone from the group of drinking men asked him: "Who are you going to pick-up here?" Before P/C Insp. Camacho was able to respond to the taunting question, P02 Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells" near the comfort room located at the right side from where the group was drinking. Consequently, P/C Insp. Camacho instructed him to collect the scattered empty shells. When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp. Camacho's orders, the former noticed a person, whom he identified as Nestor, wearing a white sando and blue walking shorts stood up. While P02 Carandang was collecting the empty shells, somebody hit him on his nape which caused him to drop his armalite. When he tried to retrieve his firearm, someone hit his hand. As he was trying to stand up, he saw Alfredo tightly holding P/C Insp. Camacho from behind while Rodrigo grabbed the former's baby armalite. As soon as P02 Carandang was able to stand up, he was hit by Nestor on his left jaw, even as he received a blow to his left eye. Thereafter, as P/C Insp. Camacho was in a helpless and defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing him to fall to the ground and later die. While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02 Andaya being tightly held by the neck by Gil. He then saw Nestor shoot at SP02 Andaya, who then fell to the ground and died. P02 Carandang retreated and started to run but Nestor went after him and shot at him. It was at this juncture when SPO1 Garcia arrived at the scene and returned fire at Nestor, hitting the latter with three out of six shots.
In Criminal Case No. P-204, the RTC finds accused NESTOR and GIL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing SP02 Andaya, and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven (11) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, and a fine of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim SP02 Andaya an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of One Million Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. P-205, the RTC finds accused NESTOR, RODRIGO and ALFREDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC, for killing P/C Insp. Camacho, and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven ( 11) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00) each. The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim P/C Insp. Camacho an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (Phpl,600,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).
The petitioners appealed to the CA. On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in relying on the unsubstantiated testimony of the alleged eyewitness P02 Carandang and holding the petitioners guilty of the crime charged.
B. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of the lower court notwithstanding the glaring insufficiency of evidence to warrant the conviction of the petitioners.
C. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that there is conspiracy between the petitioners despite failure of the prosecution to prove the same.
HELD:
It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only questions of fact. Nonetheless, the Court gave due course to the instant petition due to the following reasons:
Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal throws the whole case open for review, the Court, however, finds that this case actually presents a question of law; specifically, on whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was properly observed.
Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention to the subsequent testimony of P02 Carandang in the latter case filed against Nestor. The petitioners assert that said testimony should be considered as new and material evidence which thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant case as manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly discovered evidence without, however, necessarily withdrawing their petition. At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is denied. Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribed the availment of the remedy of new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence at this stage of appeal.
Section 1 of Rule 121 states: At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
Under Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the CA convicting the appellant becomes final.
Further, Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial is not among the remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for appeal on certiorari.
More importantly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is not worthy of the Court's consideration. Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the petitioners' contentions of alleged new evidence.
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, the Court has held that:
“When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witness were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA. For this reason alone, the petition must fail.”
However, the Court cannot totally affirm the rulings of the courts below. As forthwith stated, an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review; the Court can correct errors unassigned in the appeal. The Court finds that the Informations in this case failed to allege all the elements which constitute the crime charged.
The petitioners are being charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC.
To be more specific, the Informations do not allege that the offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person in authority, in the exercise of their duty.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance." Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct assault. The following elements must be present, to wit:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising.
In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the foregoing allegations including the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of the PNP. Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the Informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.
In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an increased penalty against the petitioners. As the Court held in People v. Rodi. While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or with insult to public authorities" (Par. 2, Art. XIV of the RPC, or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank," Par. 3, Art. XIV, RPC).
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly mandates that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language in the complaint or information. When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the increased penalty. Due to such requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).
In People v. Flores, Jr., as reiterated in the more recent cases of People v. Pangilinan and People v. Dadulla, the Court ruled that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection based on said ground or irregularity.
Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal procedure reads:
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based in the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
Indeed, the foregoing provision provides that if an accused fails to assert all the grounds available to him under Section 3 of Rule 117 in his motion to quash, or if he, altogether, fails to file a motion a quash – any objection based on the ground or grounds he failed to raise through a motion to quash shall be deemed waived, except the following, thus:
SEC. 3. Grounds.
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead of the complex crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the latter. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information ... it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.
Nevertheless, by reason of the fact that the presence of the aggravating circumstance of acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank was proven in the course of the trial, exemplary damages should be awarded in each case in addition to such other damages that were already awarded by the courts below. The grant in this regard should be in the sum of P30,000.00.
In the case of People v. Catubig, the Court elucidated on the nature of exemplary damages, thus: Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
Accordingly, since the petitioners are all found to be principally liable for the crimes committed as conspiracy was duly proven, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded against each of them. The judgment is hereby affirmed with modification. Digested by jsg.
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