ABENION v. SHELL

Cecilio Abenion,et al., Petitioners, vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Banco De Oro Unibank, Respondents

G.R. No. 200749/G.R. No. 208725

February 6, 2017

FACTS:

This is a consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by the petitioners to assail the rulings of the Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 200749 was filed by its petitioners against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC). Particularly assailed in the petition are the CA Decision dated January 31, 2011 and Resolution dated February 3, 2012, in relation to the CA’s reversal and setting aside of the Order dated June 8, 2010 rendered by the RTC OF Makati City, Branch 62, which granted an execution pending appeal against the injunction bonds posted by PSPC in Civil Case No. 09-749.

G.R. No. 208725 was filed by its petitioners against respondents PSPC and Banco de Oro Unibank (BDO) to assail the CA decision dated August 31, 2012 and Resolution dated August 8, 2013. The CA reversed via the challenged issuances. Essentially, the RTC orders allowed the petitioners’ intervention in the civil case and then eventually ordered the complaint’s dismissal.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not an execution pending appeal is allowed

2. Whether or not petitioners are allowed to intervene in PSPC’s  injunction case against BDO

HELD:

The Court affirmed the CA’s finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing execution pending appeal, it underscores the rule that an execution pending appeal must, at all times, be justified by good reasons stated in an order issued by the Court. In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was unsupported by sufficient grounds, the Court restates the rule that the trial court’s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of “good reasons”, which of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. “The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.

The execution pending appeal, however, could not be justified by conditions that applied only to a mere few claimants. Jurisprudence precludes an execution pending appeal that is, as in this case, too sweeping and unfounded by the required urgency and compelling reasons that can justify it. The RTC erred in ordering the execution pending appeal because the petitioner’s recourse against PSPC for the obligations of Shell Oil remained uncertain, even doubtful, at the time the execution pending appeal was allowed.

As to the issue on petitioner’s right to intervene in Civil Case No. 09-941, the CA ruled correctly when it declared the petitioners to be wanting of any legal interest in said case. Civil Case No. 09-941 was a complaint for injunction filed by PSPC against BDO and John Doe, as it sought to prevent the bank from releasing its funds to the sheriffs or any other person who might attempt to withdraw from its accounts under Civil Case No. 95-45. It is material that the RTC Davao City’s amended order and alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 95-45 had been nullified by the CA. This ruling could not be simply disregarded in determining the petitioner’s legal interest in Civil Case No. 09-941, especially since the appellate court defined therein the limits of Shell Oil’s obligations under the compromise agreements and the parties that were bound thereby. After finding that Shell Oil had fully satisfied its obligations under the compromise agreement, the CA went on to cite the RTC Davao City’s error in declaring affiliates and subsidiaries such as PSPC liable for the obligations of Shell Oil.

Intervention, as a remedy, is not a right but a matter that is left to the court’s discretion. In all cases, legal interest in the matter in litigation is an indispensable requirement among intervenors. As the Court ruled in Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, “the interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of judgment.” The petitioners failed to establish their interest in the funds of PSPC. The latter was neither their creditor nor one that could be held liable for the obligations of Shell Oil under the subject compromise agreement. The petitioners did not stand to lose by the injunction that was prayed for before the trial court.

Considering their failure to establish their legal interest in Civil Case No. 09-941, the petitioners could not now be allowed to raise the other issues affecting the injunction case, including the alleged procedural infirmities and the petitioner’s claim in the injunction bond posted in the case.