Showing posts with label March. Show all posts
Showing posts with label March. Show all posts

PEOPLE v. BUGARIN

PEOPLE v. BUGARIN
G.R. No. 224900
March 15, 2017


FACTS:

The case was about the allege murder of Nestor Bugarin against Esmeraldo Pontatar, Cristito Pontanar and the attempted murder against Maria Pontanar.



Bugarin was said to be seen by some witnesses carrying an unlicensed firearm, after having shot and killed Esmeraldo and Cristito Pontatar and after seriously injuring Marian Pontatar.



During trial, it was proven that, Bugarin, with deliberate intent, intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, and without regard to the victim’s age and rank, suddenly and un expectedly assaulted the said victims, which resulted to the death of Esmeraldo and Cristito Pontanar and seriously injuring Maria Pontatar. Bugarin, in his defense, stated that he only acted in self-defense, which he was not able to prove.

  • RTC- Found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of two counts of murder and one attempted murder.
  • CA- affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:

Is the CA correct?


HELD:

SC held in the positive. During trial it was proved beyond reasonable doubt, that, the petitioner was guilty of two counts of murder and one attempted murder. The defense of the petitioner that he acted in self-defense was not sufficiently proved during trial. Hence, the court finds the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of two counts of murder and one attempted murder. 

TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,respondent. 
G.R. NO. 188400
March 08, 2017


Facts:

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..


The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."



Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.



Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would


refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

The petition is granted.

PEOPLE vs. DONIO

People vs. Enrile Donio Y Untalan
GR No. 212815
March 1, 2017


FACTS:

    Accused-Appellant Donio together with his two co-accused were charged of carnapping with homicide.
    Donio assisted by counsel de officio pleaded not guilty when arraigned while his two co-accused were at-large.
     Trial on the merits proceeded.
     One of the witnesses for the prosecution is a police officer who in line with their duties and functions, conducting a checkpoint  on November 26,2003 were implementing their campaign against hijacking, carnapping  and kidnapping along McArthur Highway.
     When a speeding tricycle abruptly stop near the check point which caught the attention of the police officers. They approached the vehicle and asked the identity of the driver, and the driver handed over to the Police Officer a temporary license bearing the name Raul Layug which he likewise identified himself as Raul Layug but later identified as Enrile Donio. When asked by the Police Officers, Donio and his two companions to produce the Certificate of Legislation and official receipt of the vehicle, they failed to do so and were asked to bring the tricycle to the check point.
      Upon visual search, the police officers discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. The motorcycle and the bolo were seized by the policeman and brought the three to the police station.
      While in the police station, Donio was allowed to leave when he asked permission to get the OR and CR of the vehicle,but never returned.
       Meanwhile, in the morning of the same date, November 26, 2003, Rodrigo, the brother of Raul Layug was searching for him, the victim , who have not returned home since last night and was driving the tricycle owned by Rodrigo. Rodrigo accompanied by his cousin went to a certain barangay where they found the remains of Raul Layug. Another tricycle driver informed Rodrigo that he saw a similar tricycle that of Rodrigo's at the Conception Police Station. Rodrigo and his other brother went to the police station and found out that the two other companion of Donio were released.
      When on December 2003, the Layug brothers returned to the police station learning that Donio was apprehended.
      The police officer who brought Donio and his companions at the police station on November 26, 2003 when summoned to identify Donio as the person who asked permission from him to get the document is the same person who was apprehend by him on November 2003.
      Another prosecution witness was a doctor who conducted the Post Mortem Investigation regarding the cause of death of the victim Raul Layug and determined that he sustained stab wounds using a sharp instrument.
     On the other hand, the defense has its lone witness, the accused , who testified on the defense of alibi. That he is a grass cutter in a sugar cane plantation and seldom go home being a stay in plantation worker and never leave his place of work for six months, instead his wife visited him. That in one occasion, on the night of November 25, 2003 until the next day he was in their house after his wife fetched him  in his place of work and went home to tend their sick child.
      Donio in a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court was found guilty and case was elevated to the Court of Appeals but the decision was affirmed.


ISSUE:

Whether the Prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused of the crime of car napping with homicide.


RULING:

Yes. The prosecution has proven that the accused committed the crime of carnapping  considering that all  of the elements of the crime were existent and homicide was produced in the course of the commission of the carnapping.

FORIETRANS v DAVIDOFF

Forietrans Manufacturing Corp vs Davidoff Et. Cie Sa
G.R. No. 197482
March 6, 2017


FACTS:

Davidoff Et. Cie Sa (Davidoff) and Japan Tobacco, Inc (JTI) [collectively, respondents] are non-resident foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Switzerland and Japan, respectively. They are represented in the Philippines by law firm SyCip Salazar Henandez and Gatmaitan (SyCip law firm). Respondents also retained Business Profile, inc. (BPI) as their private investigator in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, petitioner Forietrans Manufacturing Corp (FMC) is a domestic corporation with principal address at lots 5 and 7, angeles industrial park, special economic zone, brgy. Calibutbut, Bacoor, Pampanga.

BPI reported to respondents that “there were counterfeit or product imitations of Davidoff and JTI products or products which are deceivingly similar and were stored in FMC’s warehouse. Sycip then, sought assistance from the CIDG in securing search warrants to search the said warehouse. Upon investigation the CIDG confirmed the reports of BPI. With the seized items as evidence, three separate complaint-affidavits were filed before the office of the provincial prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga charging FMC and its employees with violation of republic act no 8293.
Calaquin (FMC) denies the charges stating that FMC is and eco-zone export enterprise registered with the Philippine economic Zone Authority (PEZA) and duly authorized to import and export tabacco.

In the Joint Resolution dated September 12, 2005, second assistant Provincial Prosecutor Otto B. Macabulos dismissed the criminal complaints. Macabulos found the  affidavit of Jimmy Trocio, the informant/witness presented by PSI De Mesa in his application for search warrants, clearly insufficient to show probable cause to search FMC’s premises.

Respondents thereafter  filed a Petition for review before then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez. In his resolution dated febuary 10, 2006, secretary Gonzalez affirmed the ruling of prosecutor macabulos. Respondents moved for reconsideration. This, however, was denied with finality by secretary Gonzalez in his resolution dated March 27, 2006. Respondents elevated the case to the CA via A petition for Certiorari.

CA then reversed the resolutions of secretary Gonzalez. It adjudged that secretary Gonzalez acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming Prosecutor Macabulos’ finding that no probable cause exists against FMC. The petitioners filed a partial motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA. hence, they filed a petition to the Supreme Court. Where the the SC denies the petition for lack of merit and the decision dated march 31, 2011 and resolution dated July 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals were Affirmed. The Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was then Directed to file information against petitioners for violations of Infringement and False Designation of origin.


ISSUE: 

Was the CA correct that grave abuse of discretion was committed by Secretary Gonzalez leading to the reversal of his decision?


HELD:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal action, is defined as such facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. Only prima facie evidence is required or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Thus, probable cause with and only of itself is not sufficient as a basis to dismiss a case where evidences was presented and can be better resolved in the course of the trial.

By: Jean Paul Bartocillo


LANDBANK v. HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO, Respondents
G.R. No. 199141
March 8, 2017


FACTS:

Jose Tapulado, now deceased, was the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-17535) P-2788 with an area of 17 .8393 hectares located in Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur, and OCT No. (P-4518) P-1277 with an area of 11.1359 hectares situated in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27; and in 1978, awarded them to the farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive any compensation from the government.

It was just on March 24, 1980, that the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the subject lands, placing them at P38,002.47 or P1,315 .00 per hectare.

The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado (Tapulados), rejected the valuation of the subject lands after the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the subject lands. They filed a petition to the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and payment of just compensation.


ISSUE:

Can the Tapulados demand for the computation of just compensation with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Landbank of the Philippines (LBP)?


HELD:

Yes. Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the government since 1972, it has no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the computation of the just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because the basis for the RTC determination of just compensation was not clear.

In the determination of just compensation, the R TC should be guided by the following: (1) Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries.

(2) Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless, while it should take into account the different formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation.

(3) Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking and 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.

LOUH VS. BPI

WILLIAM & IRENE LOUH VS. BPI
G.R. No. 225562
March 8, 2017


FACTS:

Respondents BPI issued a credit card in William’s name with Irene as the extension card holder. Based on the terms and conditions, a 3.5% finance charge and 6% late payment charge shall be imposed monthly upon unpaid credit card availments.

Spouses Louh made purchases through the credit card and was able to pay regularly. However, they were remiss in their obligations starting Oct. 14, 2009. As of August 15, 2010, their account was unsettled prompting BPI to send demand letters dated Aug 7, 2010, January 25, 2011 and May 19, 2011. By September 14, 2010, the owed BPI the total amount of P533,836..27. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the spouses Louh failed to pay BPI.

On August 4, 2011, BPI filed before the RTC of Makaty City a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. William, then, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file an Answer od Responsive Pleading. The RTC granted an extension of 15 days but spouses Louh failed to comply with in the prescribed period.

On July 24, 2012, the RTC issued an Order declaring the spouses Louh in default and setting BPI’s ex parte presentation of evidence. On Novemeber 29, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of BPI. The spouses Louh filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied. The appeal they filed was likewise denied by the CA in the assailed decision and resolution. Aggrieved, the spouses Louh filed an instant petition for review on certiorari to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining BPI’s complaint.


HELD:

The Court affirms the herein assailed decision and resolution, but modifies the principal amount and attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and the CA.

The Spouses Louh reiterate that the RTC wrongly declared them in default since by reason of William's sickness, they were entitled to a relaxation of the rules. Moreover, BPI had failed to offer preponderant evidence relative to the actual amount of the Spouses Louh's indebtedness.
The foregoing claims are untenable.

In the case at bar, the CA aptly pointed out that the Spouses Louh filed their Answer with the RTC only on July 20, 2012 or more than three months after the prescribed period, which expired on March 4, 2012. When they were thereafter declared in default, they filed no motion to set aside the RTC's order, a remedy which is allowed under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made in exceptional cases.
The Spouses Louh claim as well that BPI's evidence are insufficient to prove the amounts of the former's obligation.

BPI had offered as evidence the (1) testimony of Account Specialist Carlito M. Igos, who executed a Judicial Affidavit in connection with the case, and (2) documentary exhibits, which included the (a) delivery receipts pertaining to the credit cards and the terms and conditions governing the use thereof signed by the Spouses Louh, (b) computer-generated authentic copies of the SOAs and (c) demand letters sent by BPI, which the Spouses Louh received. The Clerk of Court subsequently prepared a Commissioner's Report, from which the RTC based its judgment.

The Spouses Louh slept on their rights to refute BPI's evidence, including the receipt of the SOA’s and demand letters. BPI cannot be made to pay for the Spouses Louh's negligence, omission or belated actions.

Be that as it may, the Court finds excessive the principal amount and attorney’s fees awarded by the RTC and CA. A modification of the reckoning date relative to the computation of the charges is in order too.

In the case at bench, BPI imposed a cumulative annual interest of 114%, plus 25% of the amount due as attorney's fees. Inevitably, the RTC and the CA aptly reduced the charges imposed by BPI upon the Spouses Louh. Note that incorporated in the amount of ₱533,836.27 demanded by BPI as the Spouses Louh's obligation as of August 7, 2010 were the higher rates of finance and late payment charges, which the comis a quo had properly directed to be reduced.

In the SOA dated October 14, 2009, the principal amount indicated was ₱l13,756.83. In accordance with Macalinao, the finance and late payment charges to be imposed on the principal amount of ₱l13,756.83 are reduced to 12% each per annum, reckoned from October 14, 2009, the date when the Spouses Louh became initially remiss in the payment of their obligation to BPI, until full payment.
Anent BPI's litigation expenses, the Court retains the RTC and CA' s disquisition awarding ₱5,064.00 as filing or docket fees, and costs of suit.

However, the Court reduces the attorney's fees to five percent (5%) of the total amount due from the Spouses Louh pursuant to MCMP and Article 2227 of the New Civil Code.

The Decision and Resolution dated August 11, 2015 and May 23, 2016, respectively, of the CA, finding the spouses William and Irene Louh liable to the BPI  are AFFIRMED. The principal amount due, reckoning period of the computation of finance and late payment charges and attorney’s fees are, however, MODIFIED.

JLD

JACINTO-HENARES vs. ST. PAUL'S

KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES vs. ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF MAKATI
GR No. 215383
March 08, 2017


FACTS:

On 22 July 2013, petitioner Kim S. Jacinto-Henares, acting in her capacity as then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), issued RMO No. 20-2013, "Prescribing the Policies and Guidelines in the Issuance of Tax Exemption Rulings to Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations under Section 30 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended.”

On 29 November 2013, respondent St. Paul College of Makati (SPCM), a non-stock, non-profit educational institution organized and existing under Philippine laws, filed a Civil Action to Declare Unconstitutional [Bureau of Internal Revenue] RMO No. 20-2013 with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. SPCM alleged that "RMO No. 20-2013 imposes as a prerequisite to the enjoyment by non-stock, non-profit educational institutions of the privilege of tax exemption under Sec. 4(3) of Article XIV of the Constitution both a registration and approval requirement, i.e., that they submit an application for tax exemption to the BIR subject to approval by CIR in the form of a Tax Exemption Ruling (TER) which is valid for a period of [three] years and subject to renewal."
In a Resolution dated 22 January 2014,[9] the RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction after finding that RMO No. 20-2013 appears to divest non-stock, non-profit educational institutions of their tax exemption privilege. Thereafter, the RTC denied the CIR's motion for reconsideration. On 29 April 2014, SPCM filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated 25 July 2014, the RTC ruled in favor of SPCM and declared RMO No. 20-2013 unconstitutional. It held that "by imposing the x x x [prerequisites alleged by SPCM,] and if not complied with by non-stock, non-profit educational institutions, [RMO No. 20-2013 serves] as diminution of the constitutional privilege, which even Congress cannot diminish by legislation, and thus more so by the CIR who merely exercises quasi-legislative function.
On 18 September 2014, the CIR issued RMO No. 34-2014,[12] which clarified certain provisions of RMO No. 20-2013, as amended by RMO No. 28-2013.
Meanwhile, this Court clarifies that the phrase "Revenue Memorandum Order" referred to in the second sentence of its decision dated July 25, 2014 refers to "issuance/s" of the respondent which tends to implement RMO 20-2013 for if it is otherwise, said decision would be useless and would be rendered nugatory.


ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT the petition to review by the CIR be given merit.
2. WHETHER OR NOT the Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-2013 is unconstitutional.


HELD:

1. NO. Petition is denied on the ground of mootness. On 25 July 2016, the present CIR Caesar R. Dulay issued RMO No. 44-2016, which provides that: Amending Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-2013, as amended (Prescribing the Policies and Guidelines in the Issuance of Tax Exemption Rulings to Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations under Section 30 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended.
In line with the Bureau's commitment to put in proper context the nature and tax status of non-profit, non-stock educational institutions, this Order is being issued to exclude non-stock, non-profit educational institutions from the coverage of Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-2013, as amended.

SECTION 1. Nature of Tax Exemption. --- The tax exemption of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is directly conferred by paragraph 3, Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:
"All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."

2. YES. It was Amended. It is clear and unmistakable from the aforequoted constitutional provision that non-stock, non-profit educational institutions are constitutionally exempt from tax on all revenues derived in pursuance of its purpose as an educational institution and used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. This constitutional exemption gives the non-stock, non-profit educational institutions a distinct character. And for the constitutional exemption to be enjoyed, jurisprudence and tax rulings affirm the doctrinal rule that there are only two requisites: (1) The school must be non-stock and non-profit; and (2) The income is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. There are no other conditions and limitations as provided by law and is therefore constitutional.

In this light, the constitutional conferral of tax exemption upon non-stock and non-profit educational institutions should not be implemented or interpreted in such a manner that will defeat or diminish the intent and language of the Constitution.

DR. MALVAR VS. ATTY. BALEROS

DR. BASILIO MALVAR VS. ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS
A.C. No. 11346
March 8, 2017


FACTS:

The complainant is the owner of a parcel of land located in Barangay Pagudpud, San Fernando City, La Union.2On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari over the said lot for the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). This transaction was acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a document denominated as Confirmation of Sale.

The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal tussle between the parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was made between him and Mallari wherein he unde1iook to facilitate the steps in order to have the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's name. However, without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the delay in the delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and titling of the same before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using the complainant's name and signing the said application. A civil case for collection of sum of money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La Union seeking reimbursement for the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer and titling of the property she purchased. A compromise agreement was forged between the parties which failed because two out of the four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded. This prompted Mallari to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, against the complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La Union.

The complainant claimed that the respondent, by notarizing the assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never went to the office of the respondent for he was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.

On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found dent was negligent in the performance of her duties as a notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending disciplinary imposition against her. The pertinent portion of the Report and Recommendation24 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's  a notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility.


HELD:

The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent violated several provisions of the Notarial Rules. The complainant insists that the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land was notarized sans his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the respondent admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part of the subject document.

The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her, thus, making the notarial certification essential. 29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the complainant appeared before her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot prevail over the evidence supplied by the complainant pointing that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to appear before the respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients' record cards showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.

The respondent indeed transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by affixing her ure and seal on the notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant which provides:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.

xx xx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document-

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary public under the law to determine whether the former's signature was voluntarily affixed.

Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of Rule II of the Notarial
Rules is defined as follows:

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:

a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the d signature of the individual; or

b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.


Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the nonobservance of the obligations imposed upon her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to wit:

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the following:

(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
( 4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
( 5) the name and address of each principal;
( 6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.

xx xx

( e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the circumstances, the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. The acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the fulfilment of her duties under the Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" and the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no. falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal system being one of their primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in her notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be overemphasized that notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.

FEDERAL BUILDERS vs. POWER FACTORS

FEDERAL BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. POWER FACTORS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. NO. 211504
MARCH 8, 2017


FACTS:  

Federal Builders, Inc. (Federal) was the general contractor of the Buillion Mall (Mall) under a construction agreement with Bullion Investment and Development Corporaton (BIDC).  Federal engaged Power Factors, Inc. (Power) as its subcontractor for the electric works at the Mall and the Precinct Building (Precinct).  Upon completion of the electrical works, Power demanded payment for the unpaid amount for the electrical works performed at Precinct, from Federal, which answered that its outstanding balance under the original contract should be addressed directly to BDIC.  Said demand only fall unto the deaf ear of Federal.  Anent to this, Power seek intervention from Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).  After weighing the evidences presented, the CIAC rendered the Final Award ordering Federal to pay Power the unpaid balance on the original contract plus damages.


ISSUES:  

Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case; and Whether or not Federal was liable to pay Power the amount of the unpaid balance on the original contract plus damages.


HELD: 

Both Federal and Power agreed to submit to voluntary arbitration, hence the CIAC had jurisdiction over the case.  All that is required for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction is for the parties of any construction contract to agree to submit their dispute to arbitration.  It may be reflected in the arbitration clause of their contract, or by subsequently agreeing to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration, which need not be signed or be formally agreed upon in the contract, because it can also be in the form of other modes of communication in writing.  Consistent with the policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the arbitration.  The Contract of Service between Federal and Power, reads:  “15. Arbitration Committee – all disputes, controversies, or differences, which may arise between the parties herein, out of or in relation to or in connection with this Agreement, or for breach thereof shall be settled by the CIAC which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the aforementioned disputes.”







DAATAYA v. PEOPLE

Capistrano Daataya, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr., (Petitioners) Vs. People of the Philippines, (Respondents) 
G.R. No. 205745                                                                                   
March 08, 2017


Facts: 

On December 17, 1995, Rolando O. Bahian alleged that Capistano Daataya et al, conspiring mutually, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, assaulted, box, kick and struck Bahian. This incident happen a day after a commotion incident between the parties in the basketball court. Bahian Farther alleged that a stone was thrown to his head by petitioners that causes depress frontal fracture, open frontal bone, left, and advice for surgery. The petitioners pleaded not guilty.

The defense, apart from the three petitioners, offered the testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin), Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ). Petitioners Salisi and Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata (Vicente), in the morning of December 17, 1995. Bahian arrived with Kagawad Abalde, and called for Salisi to come out. When Salisi acceded, Bahian challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch that started a scuffle. In the course of the melee, Bahian took a swing for Salisi, who ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on the pavement and hit his head. Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened to kill him. For his part, petitioner Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some 50 meters away from Vicente's house when the incident recalled by petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired. He rushed to Vicente's house upon hearing a commotion. Farther said the Barangay Captain Yafiez arrived after an hour. They added however, that in the evening of December 16, while they were on their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he challenged them to a fight. Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.

Frustrated murder case was file against petitioners, the petitioners ordered guilty by Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners appealed in the court of appeals but affirmed guilty. However, Bahian Medical Certificates showed no injury other than that on fore head. Bahian during the questioning admitted that the injury on the forehead was cause by accidentally he hit the edge of the concrete pavement.


Issue: 

Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, a ground for acquittal of the petitioners?


Held: 

Yes, the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, a ground for acquittal of the petitioners.

The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is guaranteed under Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental right of the accused is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which specifically states that "in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 27951 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Any amount they each paid by way of a bail bond is ordered RETURNED. SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE v VILLANUEVA

PEOPLE vs. CYRUS VILLANUEVA y ISORENA alias “Tutoy” and ALVIN SAYSON y ESPONCILLA alias “Alvin Talangka,” 
G.R. No. 226475
MARCH 13, 2017


FACTS:

The accused-appellants were charged in an Information dated January 2, 2012, that on or about the 1st day of January, 2012, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, conspiring and confederating with one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Enrico Enriquez y Vinluan on the left side of his chest, thus causing fatal injury which directly caused his death.

On January 19, 2012, the prosecution moved to admit an amended information to include Christian Jay Valencia as an accused which was granted by the RTC in its Order dated February 8, 2012. With this a warrant of arrest was issued against Valencia but he still remains at large. Upon arraignment, the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty to the charge against them. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits of the case ensued.

With this, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 16, 2014, finding the accused-appellants GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC and accordingly sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and are likewise directed to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Enrico Enriquez the following: 1. Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. Php26,032.02 as actual damages; 3. Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and 4. Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Unperturbed, the accused-appellants appealed the RTC decision to the CA, with the claim that the RTC erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of murder. They maintained that the RTC improperly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

So, on April 21, 2016, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants for the crime of murder rendered by the RTC in its Decision dated September 16, 2014. The CA dismissed the instant appeal and the judgment dated September 16, 2014 of the RTC, Branch 276 of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 12-001 is hereby affirmed.


ISSUE:

That the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated September 16, 2014, which found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.


RULING:

The appeal is partly meritorious. The following essential elements must be present in order to warrant a conviction for the crime of murder: 1. that a person was killed; 2. that the accused killed him or her; 3. that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and 4. that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. One of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, which qualifies the killing of the victim to murder is abuse of superior strength.
However, according to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Both the lower courts concluded that the accused-appellants and Valencia, having the intent to kill Enrico, employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution and success of the crime. The SC openly declared that this conclusion is baseless.

In this case, the SC stated that the prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in age, size, strength or force between the accused-appellants and Valencia, on one hand, and Enrico, on the other. Indeed, the lower courts merely inferred the existence of qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength on the facts that Enrico was attacked by three assailants, the accused-appellants and Valencia, who were armed with a knife and a stone. However, mere superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.

Accordingly, the SC is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of abuse of superior strength by the lower courts. The accused-appellants’ guilt is, thus limited to the crime of homicide.
The SC dismissed the appeal and hereby affirmed with modification the Decision dated April 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Cr-HC No. 07069. Accused-appellants Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena and Alvin Sayson y Esponcilla are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC and shall accordingly each suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are directed to pay the heirs of victim Enrico Enriquez Php26,032.02 as actual damages, Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and Php50,000.00 as moral damages. They are likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum for the date of finality of this Decision until fully satisfied.


SUB-ISSUES

A. The accused-appellants’ claim that there was no proof of the conspiracy among them and Valencia. The SC stated that it is untenable it is because a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. The evidence presented by the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants and Valencia, through their acts, indeed agreed to kill Enrico.

B. The accused-appellants’ contention as regards the validity of their warrantless arrest. The SC openly declares that this contention is without merit or bearing anymore. They never raised the supposed illegality of their arrest prior to their arraignment. In fact, nowhere in any part of the proceedings before the RTC did the accused-appellants assail the validity of their arrest. They just only brought up the supposed irregularity in their arrest for the first time in their appeal to the CA. It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Digested by jsg

TSM SHIPPING v. PATIAO

TSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. LOUIE L. PATIAO
G.R. NO. 210289
MARCH 20, 2017


FACTS:

On January 13, 2010, TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of six months as GP2/OS (General Purpose 2/Ordinary Seaman) for the vessel Nord Nightingale.

On May 20, 2010, while working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing a mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray showed a fracture on his metacarpal bone. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was repatriated.

Upon arrival in Manila on May 24, 2010, petitioners referred respondent to the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, for further treatment. Respondent was also referred to an orthopedic surgeon who recommended surgical operation to correct the malunited fractured metacarpal bone. On June 8, 2010, respondent underwent Open Reduction and Internal Fixation of the fractured 5th metacarpal bone at Manila Doctors Hospital. He then went through physical therapy.
After extensive medical treatments, therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr. Cruz, on August 17, 2010, rendered an interim assessment of respondent's disability under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration - Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), at Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of one hand. Despite continuing physical therapy sessions with the company-designated physician, respondent filed on September 8, 2010 a complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for total and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. Thereafter, in a Medical Report dated October 11, 2010, Dr. Cruz declared respondent to have reached the maximum medical cure after rendering a final disability rating of Grade 10 on September 29, 2010.

On November 19, 2010, respondent consulted Dr. Nicanor Escutin, who assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman.
In a Decision dated April18, 2012, the Labor Arbiter awarded respondent total and permanent disability benefits under the AMOSUP CBA in the amount of US$80,000.00, sickness allowance of US$1,732.00, attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award or US$8,173.20, and moral and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, for the fraud and malice that attended the denial of his claims.

On appeal, petitioners attributed serious error to the Labor Arbiter for awarding full disability benefits under the CBA.

In a Decision dated October 17, 2012, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits because his injury had rendered him incapable of using his right hand, based on the last medical report of Dr. Cruz, where the latter acknowledged that respondent's right grip is poor.

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Petitioners, for their part, questioned the NLRC’s award despite lack of proof that respondent suffers from a Grade 10 disability. Respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is covered by the AMOSUP CBA and that petitioners are also liable for damages and attorney's fees in view of their bad faith.
In a Resolution dated November 23, 2012, the NLRC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. In a subsequent Resolution dated April 25, 2013, the NLRC partly granted respondent's motion for reconsideration by reinstating the Labor Arbiter's award of attorney’s fees on the ground that he was forced to litigate his claims.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128415 to enjoin the enforcement/execution of the NLRC judgment. Petitioners attributed grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC in awarding respondent US$60,000.00 without providing any substantial evidence to prove that he was suffering from Grade 10 disability and for unreasonably awarding attorney's fees despite absence of bad faith on their part.

The CA, on July 25, 2013, rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and affirming the October 17, 2012 Decision and April 25, 2013 Resolution of the NLRC.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of this Decision but was denied by the CA in its Resolution of November 28, 2013.


ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals decided in a way not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in affirming the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which held herein petitioners liable for a total of US$60,000.00 as disability benefits despite the glaring fact that the private respondent was declared as merely suffering from a Grade 10 disability as recommended by the company-designated physician;

2. Whether the sole claim of 'loss of earning capacity' and the '120-day rule' should equate to an award of US$60,000.00 despite the lack of substantial evidence to support the allegation that he is actually suffering from a Grade 10 disability and despite the undisputed evidence that he was actually suffering from a Grade 10 disability;

3. Whether the medical findings of the company-designated physician should be upheld over that issued by the physician appointed by the private respondent;

4. Whether the Court of Appeals decided in a way not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in affirming the award for 10% attorney's fees despite the fact that the private respondents failed to prove that herein petitioners acted in bad faith.


RULING:

The Court finds merit in the Petition.

The first point is that, the Respondent's complaint for disability benefits was premature.
Because of lack of proof that respondent is covered by the AMOSUP CBA, settled is the finding that his entitlement to disability benefits is governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws, which are deemed written in the contract of employment with petitioners.
Article 192(c) (1) of the Labor Code provides that: Art. 192. Permanent total disability. (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules. The Rule referred to in this Labor Code provision is Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, which states:
Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.

Section 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC also provides that:

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Citing the case in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court ruled that the aforequoted provisions should be read in harmony with each other.
Thus, based on this pronouncement in Vergara, the Court then held, in the case of C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, that a seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits in any of the following conditions:

(a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;

(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
(c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;

(d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors whom he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;

(e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;

(f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;

(g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods.[31]

Upon respondent's repatriation on May 24, 2010, he was given extensive medical attention by the company-designated physician. On August 17, 2010, an interim assessment of Grade 10 was given by Dr. Cruz as respondent was still undergoing further treatment and physical therapy. However, on September 8, 2010, or 107 days since repatriation, respondent filed a complaint tor total and permanent disability benefits. During this time, he was considered under temporary total disability inasmuch as the 120/240-day period had not yet lapsed. Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.

Moreover it is significant to note that when he filed his complaint, respondent was armed only with the interim medical assessment of the company ¬designated physician and his belief that his injury had already rendered him permanently disabled. It was only after the filing of such complaint or on November 9, 2010 that he sought the opinion of Dr. Escutin, his own physician. As such the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The next point is that the Respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation.
The Court finds serious error in the rulings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA that respondent’s disability is considered permanent and total based on the 120-day rule and on his inability to work resulting in the loss of earning capacity.

"To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration." After the initial interim assessment of Dr. Cruz, respondent continued with his medical treatment. Dr. Cruz then rendered on September 29, 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon reaching the maximum medical cure. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24, 2010 up to September 29, 2010, this assessment was made within the 240-day period. Clearly, before the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired, respondent was issued a Grade 10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the POEA-SEC. Thus, respondent could not have been suffering from a permanent total disability as would entitle him to the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00.

The Court finds the labor tribunals' rulings seriously flawed as they were rendered in total disregard of the provisions of the POEA-SEC, which is the law between the parties. The medical opinion of Dr. Escutin ought not to be given more weight than the disability grading given by Dr. Cruz. The POEA-SEC clearly provides that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. However, if the doctor appointed by the seafarer makes a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer and the latter's decision shall be final and binding on both of them.[33] The Court has held that non-observance of the requirement to have the conflicting assessments determined by a third doctor would mean that the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. As decreed by this Court in Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga, Jr.

Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down in Vergara:

The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA dearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician's assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them.
Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor’s certification is the final determination that must prevail.
Indeed, for failure of Gepanaga to observe the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and the CBA, the Court is left without a choice but to uphold the certification issued by the company-designated physician that the respondent was fit to go back to work.

In the absence of a third and binding opinion, the Court has no option but to hold Dr. Cruz's assessment of respondent's disability final and binding. At any rate, more weight should be given to this assessment as Dr. Cruz was able to closely monitor respondent's condition from the time he was repatriated in May 2010 until his last follow-up examination in October 2010. The extensive medical attention given by Dr. Cruz enabled him to acquire a detailed knowledge of respondent's medical condition. Under the supervision of Dr. Cruz, respondent underwent surgery and physical therapy. On the basis of the medical records and the results obtained from the medical treatments, Dr. Cruz arrived at a definite assessment of respondent's condition. Having extensively monitored and treated respondent's injury, the company-designated physician’s diagnosis deserves more weight than respondent's own doctor.

Moreover, the Court further finds without basis the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners' failure to rehire respondent is conclusive proof of his disability. There was no showing that respondent sought re-employment with petitioners or that it was a matter of course for petitioners to re-hire him. There was also no evidence or allegation that respondent sought employment elsewhere but was denied because of his condition.
In sum, respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation. The filing of his complaint is premature and in breach of his contractual obligation with the petitioners. Dr. Cruz's Grade 10 disability rating prevails for failure to properly dispute it in accordance with an agreed procedure. Respondent is thus entitled to the amount corresponding to Grade 10 based on the certification issued by Dr. Cruz. The Petition is granted. Digested by jsg.