GONZALES, JR. v. PEÑA

DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., Petitioner, Vs. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC., and MS. ARSENIA VERA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 214303

January 30, 2017

  

FACTS:

                The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Omnibus Resolution and resolution of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 65, which denied the prayer of petitioner Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr. to be restored as owner of the shares issued by respondent Alabang Country Club, Inc. (ACCI).

                In its Decision, the RTC of Bago City adjudged petitioner liable to respondent Magdaleno M. Peña for the payment of the agency’s fees and damages amounting to ₱28.5 million. Petitioner, together with his co-petitioners in that case, appealed the Decision, while Peña moved for execution pending appeal of this ruling. The grant of that motion resulted in the sale to Peña of petitioner’s ACCI shares. Through a private sale, he was able to sell and transfer the subject shares to respondent Arsenia Vera.

                On 19 October 2011, the Supreme Court (SC) issued a Decision in G.R. Nos.145817, 145822, 162562, entitled Urban Bank, Inc. v. Peña, which vacated with finality the Decision of the RTC.

                Considering that the Decision of the RTC had been completely vacated and declared null and void, SC held that the concomitant execution pending appeal was likewise null and without effect. Thus, SC held that Urban Bank and its officers and directors, including petitioner herein, were entitled to the full restoration of their ownership and possession of all properties that were executed pending appeal.

                The SC ordered a restitution proceedings which were raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 65. Thereafter, petitioner moved for execution, seeking restoration of his actual ACCI shares. The ACCI countered that the club shares petitioner was claiming could no longer be returned to him, because they had already been transferred by Peña to Vera.

                In its Omnibus Resolution, the RTC concluded that Peña's private sale of the shares to Vera was valid, given that the latter was an innocent purchaser for value. As such, Vera could not be charged with knowledge of the controversy involving the ACCI shares. Considering the validity of the sale, the trial court held that the actual restitution of the property to petitioner was no longer possible.

Aside from herein petitioner, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., his co-petitioners in Urban Bank - Eric L. Lee and Urban Bank, were likewise not restored to their ownership of their movable properties.

                Subsequently, petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, he came directly to this Court and asked for the reversal of the ruling of the trial court's ruling, as well as for the cancellation of the shares in the name of Vera.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the RTC faithfully complied with our directive to restore to Urban Bank and the latter's officers their properties illegally obtained by Peña.

RULING:

                The SC grant the Petition. Indeed, the RTC did not comply with the ruling in Urban Bank when it refused to restore to petitioner the actual ownership of his club shares on the mere pretext that these had already been sold by Peña to his successor-in-interest.

                As stated in Supreme Court's Decision, the RTC was bound to comply with this relevant directive:

              (b) If the property levied or garnished has been sold on execution pending appeal and Atty. Magdaleno Peña is the winning bidder or purchaser, he must fully restore the property to Urban Bank or respondent bank officers, and if actual restitution of the property is impossible, then he shall pay the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest;

                There is no factual dispute that Peña acquired the ACCI shares of petitioner by virtue of a winning bid in an execution sale that had already been declared by this Court, with finality, as null and void. In no uncertain terms, SC declared that the "concomitant execution pending appeal is likewise without any effect. Consequently, all levies, garnishment and sales executed pending appeal are declared null and void, with the concomitant duty of restitution."

                Void transactions do not produce any legal or binding effect, and any contract directly resulting from that illegality is likewise void and inexistent. Therefore, Peña could not have been a valid transferee of the property. As a consequence, his successor-in-interest, Vera, could not have validly acquired those shares. The RTC thus erred in refusing to restore the actual ACCI shares to petitioner on the basis of their void transfer to Vera.

ALICIAS, JR. v. ATTY. MACATANGAY

Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. Vs. Atty. Myrna V. Macatangay, et al.

A.C. No. 7478
January 11, 2017

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by Alicias, an Associate Professor in the College of Education of the University of the Philippines against Dean Leticia P. Ho for violation of Republic Act No. 6713. CSC found that the complaint was insufficient to support a prima facie case against Ho and was dismissed. Alicia did not receive a copy of the resolution. The records show that it was mistakenly sent to his old address.  Alicias filed the administrative complaint before the Court accusing Macatangay, Zerna, Ronquillo and Buenaflor of violation of Lawyer’s Oath or Code of Professional Responsibility, gross neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law. The court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

Commissioner found that the complaint was baseless and Alicias failed to show sufficient proof in support of his claims, thus dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the IBP can exercise jurisdiction on the administrative complaint?

RULING: 

NO.

The IBP has no jurisdiction over the disbarment complaint. The administrative complaint must be file with the Office of the Ombudsman. The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute and act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials. “in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the government to the people.”

JAVIER v. GONZALES

Loida M. Javier Vs. Pepito Gonzales

G.R. No. 193150

January 23, 2017

Facts:

           A criminal case was filed against PEPITO GONZALES and was charged of Murder with Frustrated Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.

            That on December 25, 1997, at around 11:30 in the evening, PEPITO Gonzales with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation throw a grenade inside the house of Leonardo Hermenigildo which resulted to the death of Rufino Concepcion. Hermenigildo sustained fatal  wounds which the latter also died. As a consequence of the explosives, three more persons, Julius Toledo, Ariel Cabusal and Jesus Macatiag sustained not necessary mortal wounds.

            Accused filed a Motion for bail. An opposition to the Motion for Bail was filed by Carmen Macatiag, sister of the victim Rufino Concepcion. Gonzales filed a comment on the said Motion and a reply was likewise filed. Gonzales granted to post bail and a Motion for Reconsideration on the grant of bail was filed by Macatiag and was denied. Macatiag filed again an Urgent Motion for transfer venue. Motion to Suspend hearing  was filed by Macatiag pending the resolution of the  Urgent Motion to transfer venue. The Motion to transfer venue was granted and the case was re assigned to RTC, Palayunan City.

              Trial on the merits proceeded and the Court admitted the prosecution's evidences. The accused filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Demurrer to Evidence and the Demurrer was attached to the Motion and subsequently was denied.

               The promulgation of decision was set on December 15,2005 and notice was received by the sister of the accused Gonzales but refused to sign the Return.

On the day of promulgation, the accused failed to appear but his counsel filed a Withdrawal as counsel with the conformity of the accused. The promulgation was reset to December 22, 2005. The decision was promulgated in absentia when the accused again failed to appear and counsel de officio was appointed to assist him. The accused was convicted of the charges against him and was sentenced to a death penalty. Issuance for the arrest was ordered for his non appearance and forfeiture of his bail bond was ordered. The decision was entered in the docket book of the Court

              Judge Buted ordered the immediate transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. In less than a month, the accused filed an omnibus Motion thru counsel to reconsider the promulgated decision Be reconsidered and set aside.  Judge Soluren, new Judge gave due course on the Motion filed by the accused

Granting the said Motion and reinstated his bail. Gonzales was acquitted from all the charges against him.

                A petition for certiorari was filed by Carmen Macatiag against Judge Soluren to the Court of Appeals. Court of appeals dismissed the said Petition.

ISSUES:

              Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred Affirming the Decision of Judge Soluren  setting aside the first decision of the Trial Court and in dismissing the petition filed by heir of the offended party.

               Whether or not the first promulgation of judgment was valid and whether a special civil action is the proper remedy to question the acquittal of the private respondent.

RULING:

               The Supreme Court ruled that the Petition for certiorari filed by Macatiag was with merit considering that she has sufficient interest and personality to file said Petition, under Rule 1 and 2, Rule, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Judge Soluren  as an officer acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction.

                 The promulgation of the decision rendered by Judge Buted was ruled to be valid. The accused and the offended parties were properly notified of the scheduled promulgation. Under Sec. 6, par 5, Rule 120 , Rules on criminal procedure, Judgment is for conviction and he failure of the accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the Court shall order for his arrest..

GALINDO v. COA

ANNALIZA J. GALINDO, et al, Petitioners, - versus- COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. 

G. R. No. 210788

January 10, 2017

FACTS:

         This is a petition for certiorari filed by COA Auditors/personnel  who were found guilty by the Commission on Audit of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.

     

         COA State Auditor Annaliza Galindo and  State Auditing Examiner Erlinda Pinto were assigned at the MWSS. As it has been a practice in the MWSS, COA personnel assigned in this Office are entitled to benefits that the MWSS personnel are receiving.

          On June 2, 2008, the former MWSS Administrator Allado wrote to the then COA Chairman Reynaldo Villar on the issue concerning the two COA personnel assigned in their office, were likewise receiving benefits and bonuses parallel to that of the MWSS personnel. And the said benefits and bonuses were not supported with vouchers and payrolls.

          On July 21, 2009 Chairman Villar issued an Office  Order and constituted a team from COA's Fraud Audit and Investigation Office- Legal Services Section for a fact finding Investigation. As a result of the investigation, Chairman Villar issued Letter Charges for Grave Misconduct and Violation of Office Rules and Regulation.

          The fact finding Investigating team Report are as follows :

           1.)  In 2005-2006 COA -MWSS personnel received amounts representing bonuses and other benefits.

           2.) From 1999-2003 - a total of P 1, 171, 885.00 were received by COA-MWSS representing the bonuses and benefits.

           3.) Atty. Cabibihan and ten of his staff availed of the car loan assistance of MEWF of which they only pay 40% of the purchase price by way of loan and payable to the MEWF while the balance of 60%  was paid by MEWF hence constituting it as fringe benefits.

          After the careful investigation on the matter concerning the two (2) COA-MWSS personnel, Chairman Villar, on  July 30, 2010, issued letter charges for Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations to the petitioners Galindo and Pinto along with other COA-MWSS personnel .

          COA ruled that the petitioners, Galindo and Pinto were guilty of the charges against them. They were ordered to refund the amounts they received, the unauthorized bonuses and allowances. A penalty of suspension without compensation was imposed to them.

ISSUES:

      Whether or not the Commission erred in rendering its decision against the petitioners under the Rules and Regulations of the commission.

RULING:

       The Court ruled , the DISMISSAL of the Petition filed by the two COA-.MWSS personnel on the ground that an appeal on matters of administrative disciplinary cases which the Commission decided will be filed in the Civil Service Commission not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 .

        The Commission did not erroneously acted on the case filed against the petitioners. The Commission has its independence and integrity and has its own Rules and Regulations on disciplinary and administrative cases.

       The Supreme Court can only act on matters of administrative cases involving legal matters.

      The Petitioners likewise failed to file its petition beyond the  reglementary period within which to file its petition. The decision rendered was already final and executory at the time the petition was filed.

      Petitioners questioned the quantum of evidence which were substantially produced by the prosecution and caused the establishment of their administrative liability.

JEBSEN'S MARITIME v. RAPIZ

Jebsen’s Maritime, Inc., Sea Chefs Ltd. And Enrique M. Aboitiz, Petitioners, vs. Florvin G. Rapiz, Respondent
G.R. No. 218871

January 11, 2017

FACTS:

            On March 16, 2011, Jebsens, on behalf of its foreign principal, Sea Chefs, engaged the services of respondent to work on board the M/V Mercury as a buffet cook for a period of nine (9) months with a basic monthly salary of $501.00. On March 30, 2011, respondent boarded the said vessel. However, in September 2011, respondent was diagnosed with “Tendovaginitis Dequevain”  which caused his medical repatriation since it was not possible for him to work without using his right forearm.

            On October 14, 2011, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and after a lengthy treatment, the company-designated physician gave him a disability rating of Grade 11. Dissatisfied, respondent consulted an independent physician, who classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability. Thereafter, respondent requested petitioners to pay him total and permanent disability benefits, which the latter did not heed, thus, constraining the former to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the parties submitted the same to the Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) for adjudication.

            Respondent argued that he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits as he was unable to work as a cook for a period of 120 days from his medical repatriation. On the other hand, petitioners maintained that respondent is only entitled to Grade 11 disability benefits pursuant to the classification made by the company-designated physician.

            The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruled in respondent’s favor which was later on affirmed by the CA. Petitioner’s moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 5, 2015; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

           

            Whether or not the CA correctly held that respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

HELD:

            The petition is meritorious. In the case at bar, the VA and the CA’s award of permanent and total disability benefits in respondent’s favor was heavily anchored on his failure to obtain any gainful employment for more than 120 days after his medical repatriation. However, in Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, the Court explained that the company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability.

            A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work.

            In Elburg Ship Management Phils. Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., the Court further clarified that for the company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an extension; otherwise, the seafarer’s disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total. Accordingly, the Court laid down the following guidelines that shall govern seafarer’s claims for permanent and total disability benefits: (1) the company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him; (2) if the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total; (3) if the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification, then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and (4) if the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

            The records reveal that on October 14, 2011, respondent was medically repatriated for what was initially diagnosed by the ship doctor as “Tendovaginitis DeQuevain.” As early as January 24, 2012, or just 102 days from repatriation, the company-designated physician had already given his final assessment on respondent when he diagnosed the latter with “ Flexor Carpi Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor Carpi Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right” and gave a final disability rating of “ Grade 11” pursuant to the disability grading provided in the 2010 POEA-SEC. In view of the final disability rating made by the company-designated physician classifying respondent’s disability asd merely permanent and partial-which was not refuted by the independent physician except that respondent’s condition was classified as Grade 10 disability- it is plain error to award permanent and total disability benefits to respondent. Hence, the petition is granted.

TOLENTINO v. UMALI

Marita Tolentino and Fely San Andres, Complainants vs. Sheriff IV Glenn Umali, Respondent

A.M. No. P-16-3615

January 24, 2017

FACTS:

On February 4 and 5, 2015, Judge Corazon A. Domingo-Rańola, Presiding Judge of RTC of Malolos City, Branch 10, received separate letter-complaints from Marita Tolentino and Fely San Andres, respectively alleging that Glenn Umali received the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 100,000.00) from San Andres representing payment of the judgment debt awarded in Tolentino’s favor in Criminal Case No. 01-7892 then pending before the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan. The letter-complaints requested a conference before Judge Rańola to resolve the issue because it appears that such amount was neither delivered to Tolentino or the clerk of court, nor was it deposited to the MTC’s bank account. Subsequently, Judge Rańola held the requested conference, during which Umali agreed to pay the unremitted judgement debt on or before March 13, 2015. Thereafter, Judge Rańola reported the matter to RExecutive Judge Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega of the RTC of Bulacan through a Memorandum dated February 17, 2015. Judge Arcega referred the Memorandum to the OCA for appropriate action.

Pursuant to the OCA’s directive, Umali filed his undated comment to the letter-complaints, asserting that the matter was merely a result of a misunderstanding, and that it had been resolved, since he already remitted the full amount of the judgment debt in Tolentino’s favor. After an evaluation of the records of the case and the submissions of the parties, the OCA recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Umali is guilty of grave misconduct

HELD:

Yes. The Court agrees with the OCA’s recommendation. Under Section 46 (A) (3), Rule 10 on the Schedule of Penalties of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service in the first instance. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and being barred from taking civil service examinations.

Umali’s bare assertion that his failure to turn over the judgment debt in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court resulted from a “misunderstanding” is specious, at best. The fact that Umali did not offer any form of explanation as to the nature, cause and incidents of this so-called misunderstanding shows that it was a mere afterthought and a lame excuse offered after his misdeed had been discovered. Moreover, while the Court is aware that it may consider circumstances to mitigate the imposable penalty prescribed under the RRACCS, no such circumstance has been invoked, nor does any appear from the records of the case.

The Court finds respondent Glenn Umali guilty of grave misconduct, meriting the penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.

PEOPLE v. QUITA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,  -versus – GREGORIO QUITA alias "GREG", Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 212818

January 25, 2017

FACTS:

On November 17, 2002 at around 8:30 in the evening he was at home at Greenland Street, Better Living Subdivision, Parafiaque City having just arrived from work, when his daughter told him that Roberto was having a dri.nking session nearby; that while on his way to fetch Roberto, he saw three persons fighting; that when he went near the trio he saw Gregorio holding Roberto's hand at the back while Roberto was being stabbed by Fleno; that when he shouted9 his son's assailant') took to their heels; and that he ran afrer them, but when the two reached a dark alley he no longer pursued them. He then went back to where roberto was lying.

Gregorio made a total denial that he had ever known the victim or met him even once. He claimed that prior to the incident in question he was residing at No. 10 SMI Compound, Sucat, Kupang, Muntinlupa City. In 2004 he transferred his family to Paliparan 3, Dasmarifias City in Cavite, where his parents had a piece of land. Here, he found work as a tricycle driver. Sometime in the early part of January 2007, while driving his tricycle, someone told him to go to Parafiaque City because a warrant for his arrest was waiting for him there. He went with that person to Parafiaque City because he knew he did not commit any crime. But when he got there, he was at once brought to the Special Investigation Division at the Parafiaque Coastal Area, where he was told to sign a blank piece of paper, which, according to the person who brought him there, meant that he had killed somebody from the Better Living Subdivision in Parafiaque City. After signing the blank piece of paper he was detained in jail and was told that ifhe believed he was innocent of the accusation against him, he should prove his innocence in court.

The RTC ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime MURDER While the CA modified the ruling increasing the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not accused appellant is guilty of murder.

Rulings:

As the CA ruled that There is treachery when 'the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms 01 the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the oftended party might make. These means or methods are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to resist or escape the impending attack. Holding the hands of the victim to his back while he was being stabbed rendered hint defenseless against the perpetrators thereby insuring the execution of the crime without risk to the offenders of any defense that the victim might make.

The testimony of the witness that the assailant was in front of the victim when he was stabbed was corroborated by the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim that since the wounds were located anteriorly, it is possible for the assailant to inflict the fatal wound in front of the victim, although he did not discount the fact that the assailant could be at the back of the victim holding  And, because of the positive identification of the accused-appellant, his alibi deserved scant consideration. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed.

As SC rulings, Gregorio's appeal before this Court is predicated essentially upon the selfsame lone assignment of error set forth in his Brief with the CA. Since the factual findings by the CA are binding upon this Court, especially when the CA's findings unite with the RTC's factual findings, as in this case, this Court is not at liberty to reject or disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. Indeed, this Court is satisfied that the factual findings of both lower courts are in accord with the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CAHAMBING v. ESPINOSA and ANG

ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING vs. VICTOR ESPINOSA AND JUANA ANG
January 25, 2017

G.R. No. 215807

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent Victor Espinosa are siblings and the children of deceased spouses Librado and Brigida Espinosa, the latter bequeathing their properties, among which is Lot B or Lot 354 with an area of 1,341 square meters, more or less, situated in Maasin City, Southern Leyte, to the said siblings in the same deceased spouses’ respective Last Wills and Testaments which were duly probated.

Deceased Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over Lot 354 to respondent Victor Espinosa, however, Brigida subsequently revoked and cancelled her will, giving her one-half (1/2) share over Lot 354 to petitioner.Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa, after the death of Librado Espinosa, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A. Not being included in the partition of Lot 354, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Victor Espinosa and his representative.

Thereafter, respondent Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated March 3, 2009 against petitioner alleging that the latter violated the status quo ante order by allowing her sons to occupy the space rented by Jhanel’s Pharmacy which is one of respondent Victor Espinosa’s tenants.

The RTC, finding merit to the application for temporary restraining order filed by respondent Victor Espinosa, granted the same on March 6, 2009. Thereafter, the RTC, on September 22, 2009, issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the defendant’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is GRANTED.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in the decision and that the petition for certiorari be given merit in favor of the petitioner.

HELD:

NO. This Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the elements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are present in this case. As aptly ruled by the CA:

In this case, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor Espinosa had established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel’s Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease with the pharmacy up to December 2009. Without prejudging the main case, it was established that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order dated April 16, 1998, Jhanel’s Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent Victor Espinosa’s tenants. In fact, petitioner identified only Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane’s Gift Items and Julie’s Bakeshop. As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent Victor Espinosa who must continue to deal with Jhanel’s Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the commercial space occupied by Jhanel’s Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the possession and control of private respondent Victor Espinosa as of the time of the issuance of the status quo order.

All of the above findings and considerations expounded in the CA’s assailed decision and resolution contain no reversible error, thus, they should not be disturbed. It must always be remembered that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. In this case, no manifest abuse can be attributed to the RTC that issued the questioned writ. This Court has also held that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary injunction where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses.

REPUBLIC vs. SUSI

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERTRUDES V. SUSI 

January 16, 2017

G.R. No. 213209

FACTS:

On September 27, 2005 Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition 6 for reconstitution of TCT No. 118999 purportedly registered in her name, Covering Lot 257 of plan Psu-32606 located m Barrio (now Barangay) Talanay, Quezon City (QC), with an area of 240,269 square meters (subject land). She claimed that the original copy of TCT No. 118999 was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (RD-QC) on June 11, 1988; hence, the petition based on the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999,9 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-20493(05).

On January 16, 2006, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation dated December 5, 2005 stating that respondent filed similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and 220 of the same RTC, for which it had previously issued Reports dated March 1, 1995 and December 12, 1995, respectively.

On February 2, 2006, Susi presented proof of the jurisdictional requirements without any opposition. After Susi was allowed to formally offer her evidence, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the case, and manifested that it had deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC to appear on its behalf, subject to its supervision and control.

In a Decision23 dated January 12, 2011 (January 12, 2011 Decision), the RTC granted Susi’s petition, and directed the RD-QC to reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 118999. The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner’s copy of TCT No. 11899925 and the Certification26 from the RD-QC that the original of TCT No.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. WHETHER OR NOT the CA erred in the decision rendered.

HELD:

1. NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other matters raised in the petition.

At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens. Thus, whether or not the OSG’s motion to vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the RTC which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the registered owner thereof.

In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, particularly, on the service of notices of hearing on the registered owners and/or actual possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other matters raised in the petition.

2. YES. As aforementioned, the court finds it unnecessary to look into the other matters as raised in the petition for, first and foremost, the decision rendered by the RTC is null and void.

The Decision dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated June 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127144, upholding the Order dated July 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05) which denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, and sustained the grant of the petition for reconstitution filed by respondent Gertrudes V. Susi, are hereby SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the petition for reconstitution for lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE v. DAYADAY

People of the Philippines Vs. Roque Dayaday y Dagooc

G.R. No. 213224

January 16, 2017

Facts:

On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about 10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home along the road in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato6 after attending a wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo Dayaday, when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place was well lit and he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his gun.  For fear of his life, Alex ran away from the place of incident. He reported the incident to his uncle Petring Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala. Finding the positive testimony of Alex credible as against Roque's defense of alibi, the RTC convicted Roque of the crime of murder and sentenced him accordingly.

Roque appealed to the CA.

The CA concurred with the RTC's finding on Alex's credibility and dismissed the alleged inconsistencies in his testimony. Moreover, the CA found Roque's defense of alibi very flimsy. According to the CA, while the defense witnesses claimed that Roque was cooking at the time of the commission, it was not physically impossible for Roque to be at the scene of the crime because the place where he was allegedly cooking was in the same vicinity where the crime was committed.

Thus, appealed to SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Roque's conviction for the crime of murder.

Held:

The Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the R TC are sustained by the CA.

In the present case, both the R TC and CA found the testimony of Alex straight forward and worthy of belief. Alex identified Roque as the one who shot his father at the back and his positive declaration was never destroyed even after cross-examination in court. For his part, Roque failed to identify any significant fact or circumstance which would justify the reversal of the RTC's and CA's findings on Alex's credibility.

In People v. Montemayor, the Court ruled that relationship by itself does not give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. The relationship of a witness to the victim would even make his testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge and prosecute another person other than the real culprit. Relatives of victims of crimes have a natural knack for remembering the faces of the attacker and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by having the felon brought to justice and meted the proper penalty. Where there is no showing of an improper motive on the part of the prosecution's witnesses for testifying against the appellant, their relationship to the victim does not render their testimony less credible. 39 In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or improper motive on the part of Alex to testify against the accused, his relationship with the victim even made his testimony more credible and truthful.

The Court also agrees with the CA that the inconsistency between Alex's affidavit and his testimony in open court as to whether there are other witnesses to the crime is immaterial to affect his credibility, because it does not detract from the fact that Alex saw and identified Roque as the assailant of his father.40 In People v. Yanson, 41 the Court held:

x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.

xx xx The discrepancies in the witness's testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy the witness's credibility.

METROBANK v. LIBERTY CORRUGATED

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS.  LIBERTY CORRUGATED BOXES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 184317

January 25, 2017

Facts:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007

Order approving Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp.'s rehabilitation plan.

Respondent Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp. is a domestic corporation that produces corrugated packaging boxes.  It obtained various credit accommodations and loan facilities from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) amounting to Pl 9,940,000.00. To secure its loans, Liberty mortgaged to Metrobank 12 lots in Valenzuela City.

On June 21, 2007, Liberty filed a Petition8 for corporate rehabilitation before Branch 7 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City. Liberty claimed that it could not meet its obligations to Metrobank because of the Asian Financial Crisis, which resulted in a drastic decline in demand for its goods, and the serious sickness of its Founder and President, Ki Kiao Koc.

Liberty's rehabilitation plan consisted of: (a) a debt moratorium; (b) renewal of marketing efforts; (c) resumption of operations; and ( d) entry into condominium development, a new business.

On August 6, 2007, Metro bank filed its comment/opposition. It argued that Liberty was not qualified for corporate rehabilitation; that Liberty's Petition for rehabilitation and rehabilitation plan were defective; and that rehabilitation was not feasible. It also claimed that Liberty filed the Petition solely to avoid its obligations to the bank.

Rehabilitation Receiver Rafael Chris F. Teston recommended the approval of the plan, provided that Liberty would initiate construction on the property in Valenzuela within 12 months from approval.

In its December 21, 2007 Order, the Regional Trial Court approved the rehabilitation plan. Metrobank appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued the Decision16 denying the Petition and affirming the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007 Order.

The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court correctly approved the rehabilitation plan over Metrobank's Opposition upon the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver, who had carefully considered and addressed Metrobank's criticism on the plan's viability.

The Court of Appeals stressed that the purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the distressed company to gain a new lease on life and to allow the creditors to be paid their claims. It held that the approval of the Regional Trial Court was precisely "'to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation' of ailing corporations” as required by Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent, as a debtor in default, is qualified to file a petition for rehabilitation under Presidential Decree No. 902-A and Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules; and
2. Whether respondent's Petition for rehabilitation is sufficient in form and substance and respondent's rehabilitation plan, feasible.

Held:

1) Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides:

RULE4

Debtor-Initiated Rehabilitation

SECTION 1. Who May Petition. - Any debtor who foresees the impossibility of meeting its debts when they respectively fall due, or any creditor or creditors holding at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the debtor's total liabilities, may petition the proper Regional Trial Court to • have the debtor placed under rehabilitation.

Philippine Bank of Communications v. Basic Polyprinters and Packaging Corporation50 reiterates the purpose of rehabilitation, which is to provide meritorious corporations an opportunity for recovery: Under the Interim Rules, rehabilitation is the process of restoring "the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern that if it is immediately liquidated." It contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

2) The Interim Rules provide for a liberal construction of its provisions:

RULE2

Definition of Terms and Construction

SECTION 2. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of Sections 5(d), 6(c) and 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases. Where applicable, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily to proceedings under these Rules.

To adopt petitioner's interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Interim Rules. There is no reason why corporations with debts that may have already matured should not be given the opportunity to recover and pay their debtors in an orderly fashion. The opportunity to rehabilitate the affairs of an economic entity, regardless of the status of its debts, redounds to the benefit of its creditors, owners, and to the economy in general. Rehabilitation, rather than collection of debts from a company already near bankruptcy, is a better use of judicial rewards.

A.M. No. 08-8-1 O-SC further describes the remedy initiated by a petition for rehabilitation: A petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan, containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. RAPANOT

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. RAPANOT

GR No. 191636

JANUARY 16, 2017

FACTS:

Golden Dragon Real Estate Corporation (Golden Dragon) is the developer of Wack-Wack Twin Towers Condominium in Mandaluyong City.  Ronald Rapanot (Ronald) bought Unit 2308-B2, on May 9, 1995.  On September 13, 1995, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, formerly known as Prudential Bank (Bank),  extended a loan to Golden Dragon in the amount of P50,000,000.00 to be utilized by the latter as additional working capital.  To secure the loan, Golden Dragon executed a mortgage Agreement in favor of the Bank, which had the effect of constituting a real estate mortgage over several condominium units owned and registered under Golden Dragon’s name.  Unit 2308-B2 is among said units subject of said mortgage agreement.

Ronald made several verbal demands for the delivery of Unit 2308-B2, being its lawful owner, but to no avail.  Hence he filed a complaint before the Expanded National Capital Region Field Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).    No settlement was arrived at before the said Office. The Arbiter rendered a decision on July 3, 2002, in favor of Ronald, directing Golden Dragon and the Bank to deliver to Ronald the title of the condominium unit and to pay damages and costs.

On January 16, 2003, the Bank filed a Petition for Review with the HLURB Board Commissioner, who, in turn affirmed the decision of the HLURB.  Thereafter the Bank went to the Office of the President, which denied its appeal declaring that the Bank was given due process, and adopted the ruling of the HLURB.  Again, the Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, who in turn affirmed the decision of the HLURB.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the resolution of the Office of the President finding that the Bank had been afforded due process before the HLURB; and
2. Whether the not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the resolution of the Office of the President that the Bank cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith.

HELD: 

NO.  The Bank was not deprived of due process before the HLURB.  The Bank was able to set out its position by participating in the preliminary hearing and the scheduled conferences before the Arbiter and even assert its special and affirmative defenses in its Answer to Ronald’s claim.

It was a clear fact that the Arbiter merely acted in accordance with the 1996 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB when it rendered its decision on the basis of the pleadings and records submitted by the parties. 

The mortgage agreement is null and void against Ronald, and thus cannot be enforced against him.  The Bank failed to take note of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which states:  no mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior approval of the Authority.  The mortgage entered into by and between the Bank and Golden Dragon violates the said provision.  Ronald, who was the buyer of the subject condominium unit, was not notified of the mortgage before the release of the loan proceeds by the Bank.  It was an act executed against the provisions of mandatory prohibitory laws, hence, void because of the Bank’s failure to comply with PD 957. 

SECURITY BANK vs. GREAT WALL

Security Bank Corporation Vs. Great Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 219345                                                                                   

January 30, 2017

Facts: 

May 12, 2013, Security Bank Corporation, the petitioner, filed a complaint (with application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment) against the respondents, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Makati City. The complaint sought to recover from respondents their unpaid obligations under a credit facility covered by several trust receipts and surety agreements, as well as interests, attorney’s fee and cost. The petitioner argued that in spite of the lapse of the maturity date of the obligation from December 11, 2012 to May 7, 2013, respondents failed to pay their obligations. The total principal amount sought was P10,000,000.00.

After due hearing, the RTC granted the application for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment of Security Bank, which then posted a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. Then respondent filed to lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment but denied by RTC. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by RTC.

Dissatisfied respondents filed a petition for certiorari before CA, December 12, 2014, the CA lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated June 26, 2015.

Issue: 

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in nullifying the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court.

Held: 

Yes, the CA erred in nullifying the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court.

Under section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, Preliminary Attachment section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.- At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases: (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or the performance thereof:

Wherefore, the December 12, 2014 Decision and the June 26, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131714 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 13-570, pursuant to its May 31, 2013 Order, is upheld. 

ATTY. GEROMO vs. LA PAZ HOUSING

Atty. Reyes G. Geromo, Florencio Buentipo, Jr., Ernaldo Yambot and Lydia Bustamante, petitioners Vs. La Paz Housing and Development Corporation and Government Service Insurance System, respondents.

G.R. No. 211175

January 18, 2017

Facts: 

Year 1987, Atty. Geromo, Bustamante and Yambot started occupying their respective residential units from Adelina 1−A subdivision in San Pedro, Laguna from La Paz, through GSIS financing. The properties were all situated along the old Litlit Creek.  Buentipo, on the other hand, opted to demolish the turned over unit and build a new structure thereon. After more than two (2) years of occupation, cracks started to appear on the floor and walls on their houses. The petitioners, through the President of the Adelina 1−A Homeowners Association, requested La Paz, being the owner/developer to take remedial action.  They collectively decided to construct a riprap/retaining wall in which La Paz contributed p3,000 for each but petitioners claimed that despite of this retaining wall, the condition of their housing units worsened as the years passed. La Paz alleged that the structural defects could have been caused by the 1990 earthquake. Year 1998, the petitioners decided to leave their housing units.

May 2002, upon the request of the petitioners, the Municipal Engineer of San Pedro and the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) conducted an ocular inspection of the subject properties. They found that there was “differential settlement of the area where the affected units were constructed”. On the basis thereof, Atty. Geromo filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against La Paz and GSIS before Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB) on May 3, 2003, Buentipo, Yambot and Bustamante filed a similar complaint against La Paz and GSIS. They asserted that La Paz was liable for implied warranty against hidden defects and it was negligent in building their houses on unstable land. La Paz averred that it had secured the necessary permits and licenses for the subdivision project. The GSIS moved for the dismissal of the complaint for its only participation in the transaction was to grant loans to the petitioners for the purchase of their respective properties.

August 9, 2014 Decision, the HLURB Arbiter found La Paz liable for the structural damage on the petitioners housing units, explaining that the damage was caused by its failure to properly fill and compact the soil on which the houses were built and to maintain (3) meters easement from the edge of the creek as require by law. As to GSIS, the HLURB ruled that GSIS is not liable. September 12, 2005 decision of HLURB Board of Commissioners set aside the Arbiter’s decision. The petitioners move for reconsideration but denied. The aggrieved petitioners elevated the case to Office of the President (OP) which initially dismissed due to late filing. The petitioners question the dismissal before the CA, and the CA ordered the OP to resolve the appeal on the merits. Then the OP finally rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. The petitioners appealed the OP decision on CA, but the CA affirmed the ruling of the OP. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but denied.

Issue: 

Whether La Paz should be held liable for the structural defects on its implied warranty against hidden defects.

Held: 

Yes, La Paz is liable for the structural defects on its implied warranty against hidden defects.

Under Civil Code Article 1561, The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the hidden defects which the thing sold may have, should they render it unfit for the use for which it is intended, or should they diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would not have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it; but said vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects or those which may be visible, or for those which are not visible if the vendee is an expert who, by reason of this trade or profession, should have known them. And under  Article 1566 of the Civil Code, the vendor is responsible to the vendee for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof. This provision shall not apply if the contrary has been stipulated and the vendor was not aware of the hidden faults or defects in the thing sold.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The August 9, 2004 Decision of the HLURD Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION to read as follows: (1) Ordering respondent La Paz Housing and Development Corporation to immediately undertake and cause the necessary repairs/construction of the subject units to make it suitable for human habitation for which it was originally intended; (2) In the alternative, if it would no longer possible for the said units to be repaired to make it suitable for human habitation, ordering respondent La Paz to give each petitioner another property of the same nature and size, more or less, within the subdivision project or in any project owned and develop by La Paz in San Pedro, Laguna, or pay the monetary equivalent thereof; and (3) Ordering respondent La Paz to pay each of the petitioners: a. the sum P200,000.00 as temperate damages; b. the sum of P150,000.00 as moral damages; c. the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; d. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and e. cost of suit. All awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the finality of the judgment until full payment, in line with recent jurisprudence. SO ORDERED.

C.I.C.M. vs. REYES

C.I.C.M MISSION SEMINARIES (MARYHURST, MARYHEIGHTS, MARYSHORE AND MARYHILL) SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, INC., FR. ROMEO NIMEZ, CICM, Petitioners, Vs. MARIA VERONICA C. REYES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 220506

January 18, 2017

FACTS:

This controversy is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed by the respondent against the petitioners. In its June 16, 2008 Decision, the Labor Arbiter recognized respondents right to receive from the petitioners backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Thus, it ordered the petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate amount of P286, 670.58. The LA decision was affirmed by the NLRC, by the CA and by the SC in G.R. No. 200490.

The Decision became final and executory on October 4, 2012, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. Consequently, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The petitioners opposed and moved for the issuance of a certificate of satisfaction of judgment, alleging that their obligation had been satisfied by the release of the cash bond in the amount of P272, 337.05 to respondent.

In its July 10, 2014 Order, the LA ruled that the cash bond posted by the petitioners was insufficient to satisfy their obligation. LA ordered them to award respondent a total amount of P1, 847, 088.89, from this amount should be deducted the amount received at P272, 337.05.  Thus, the additional backwages and separation pay due is P1, 575, 751.84.

The petitioners elevated an appeal before NLRC, but the LA ruling was affirmed.

A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, but the said petition was dismissed.

ISSUES:

1. What should be the basis for the computation of the backwages and separation pay of an illegally dismissed employee in a case where reinstatement was not ordered?
2. Whether or not he CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion when the NLRC affirmed the LA’s findings.
3. Whether or not the computation made by the LA in the main case could no longer be disturbed following the doctrine of immutability of judgment.

HELD:

1. In the event the aspect of reinstatement is disputed, backwages, including separation pay, shall be computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering the separation pay. In Gaco v. NLRC, it was ruled that with respect to the payment of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee, the period shall be reckoned from the time compensation was withheld up to the finality of this Court’s decision.

2. No. Grave abuse of discretion, which has been defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, requires proof that the CA committed errors such that its decision was not made in contemplation of law. The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts. In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to carry out such burden.

3. The court disagrees with the petitioners’ assertion that a recomputation would violate the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It has been settled that no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction thereof. The recomputation of the awards stemming from illegal dismissal case does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of the dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on Febuary 3, 2016 is hereby LIFTED.

STATUS MARITIME v. DOCTOLERO

STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION and ADMIBROS SHIP MANAGEMENT Co. LTD., Petitioners VS. RODRIGO C. DOCTOLERO, Respondent

G.R. No. 198968

January 18, 2017

FACTS:

          On July 28, 2006, Status Maritime hired Doctolero as Chief Officer on board the vessel M/V Dimitris Manios II for a period of nine months with basic salary of US $1,250.00. Doctolero declared fit to work by (PEME) Pre-Employment Medical Examination prior to his deployment.

         On October 28, 2006, while Doctolero was on board, he experienced chest and abdominal pains. He was brought to a medical clinic in Vera Cruz, Mexico and no clear diagnosis was made then he resumed work on board the vessel. However, in the evening of the same day he complained again of abdominal pain, which he was brought to Clinic San Luis in Mexico, and he was diagnosed from “Esophago-Gastritis-Duodenitis”. Based on the assessment of the attending physician, Dr, Jorge Hernandez Bustor recommended for his repatriation.

         Moreover, on October 29, 2006, the respondent experienced difficulty of breathing while waiting for his return flight. He informed the ship’s agent of his condition and requested for assistance but to no avail. Thus, he himself went to the Hospitales Nacionales where he was admitted. He paid the hospital bills amounting to MXN $ 7,032.17 on his own. After his discharge, he sought assistance from the Philippine Embassy for his repatriation to the Philippines.

         On November 16, 2006, the company designated physician evaluated Doctolero’s condition and found normal diagnostic tests.

         On January 22, 2007, Doctolero filed a complaint in the (NLRC) National Labor Relation Commission demanding the petitioner for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of hospital expenses, sick wage allowance, moral and exemplary damages and legal interest on his claims, on account of illness suffered while working on board.

         The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and the initial diagnosis of gastro-duodenitis was not listed as an occupational illness in the POEA-SEC and no evidence that shows such illness is aggravated by the working conditions on board of the vessel.

         On appeal, the NLRC found no basis for award of sickness allowance and disability pay. But the petitioner are ordered to reimburse the respondent’s cost of his medical treatment.

        The respondent assailed the decision of the NLRC in the Court of Appeals, and ordered the petitioner to pay the permanent and total disability benefits, moral exemplary damages, reimbursement of the hospital expenses in Mexico City, legal interest on the monetary awards, sick wage allowance and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

         Whether or not Doctolero is entitled to claim the permanent and total disability benefits from the petitioner.

HELD:

         No. Since permanent and total disability as defined in Article 198 (c) (1) of the Labor Code, to wit, (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent; (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days except as otherwise provided for in the Rules.

        In order for a seafarer claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper, any of the following conditions shall be present:

1. The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days.
2. 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician.
3. The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240 days period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under section 20-B (3) of the POEA-SEC are a contrary opinion.
4. The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well.
5. The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on disability grading.
6. The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B (3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work.
7. The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits.
8. The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.

        The Supreme Court ruled the reversal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding permanent disability benefits to the respondent and reinstate the decision of NLRC and order the respondent to pay the costs of suit.